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Abstract
Mathematical Models of the Representation of Faces
in Humans
Jonathan Neil O’Keeffe
The representation of faces is a crucial function of the human CNS,
as demonstrated by the severe social difficulties experienced when peo-
ple lack this ability (prosopagnosia). However, the precise way in which
faces are represented and differentiated from one another is not well un-
derstood. This work addresses two substantial issues.
Firstly, how is information about faces integrated over time? In chapter
2 a simple model of temporal integration is set forth, based on the statis-
tical technique of exponential smoothing. In chapter 3 results of exper-
iments testing this model are presented, demonstrating the model to be
inadequate in certain respects. In particular a systematic bias towards the
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origin of face space is observed, a phenomenon referred to as ”bowing”.
Chapter 4 contains a further model, which aims to show how this bowing
could arise from a Bayesian inferential process.
The second issue, addressed in chapter 5 of this thesis, is how well hu-
man judgements of facial similarity correspond to predictions made using
Basel Face Space (BFS), a popular and widely used representation of faces
from the field of computer vision. The degree of agreement is quantified
using a novel experimental approach, and subsequently salient differences
between the biological face space and BFS, including some original find-
ings relating to isotropy or directionality, are demonstrated.
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1
Introduction
In this introductory chapter some of the fundamental issues concern-
ing levels of explanation and analysis within neuroscience are first in-
troduced. Leaning on the work of David Marr, it is argued that an un-
derstanding at the algorithmic/representational level is of great prac-
tical import in addition to its conceptual validity. The classical cog-
nitive neuroscience paradigm is discussed, and in particular the cen-
tral concept of a representation, citing some of the challenges which
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have been made to this construct, particularly from within dynamical
systems and robotics. There follows an account of Valentine’s con-
ception of face space, placing it within its historical and intellectual
context. Finally I discuss the ”Bayesian brain” within neuroscience
reviewing some of the basic concepts. The chapter concludes with a
summary that draws these threads together and relates them to the
substance of this thesis.
1.1 Levels of Explanation in Neuroscience
There is in biology today an understandable, and in many respects salu-
tary, bias towards molecular and cellular mechanisms, as pronounced in
neuroscience as anywhere. However, as has been explicitly recognised, at
least since Marr’s seminal contributions to the field [Marr, 1983], a full un-
derstanding of the brain must comprise a representational and algorithmic
account in addition to low level mechanistic accounts.
This is a matter with very practical implications, well beyond a purely
academic concern for the full understanding of a system. A case in point is
the field of neuromodulation or functional neurosurgery. This field began
with efforts at using DBS (Deep Brain Stimulation) to treat the symptoms
of motor disorders, such as Parkinsonian and essential tremor. Remark-
ably it turns out that essentially the same methods can be applied to treat-
ment resistant depression and obsessive compulsive disorder [O’Keeffe,
2011, Dyster et al., 2016]. And yet, there is essentially no consensus on the
mechanism of action by which this therapy works [Torres-Sanchez et al.,
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2017]. This then is a clear example of where our ability to intervene has
outstripped our scientific understanding of the phenomenon, analogous
to the development of steam engines before the science of thermodynam-
ics, which governs their operation, was understood. While early steam
engines such as the Savery Engine were useful, they exhibited efficiencies
on the order of a few percent, and the support of a sound body of scien-
tific theory, provided by Carnot, Watt and many others, was required to
unleash the full potential of this technology [Cardwell, 1971]. Accordingly
in neuroscience, as attempts to read and write information within neural
circuits grow in ambition 1, for therapeutic or other purposes, so it be-
comes increasingly imperative to understand neural communication and
computation at the systems, representational and algorithmic level.
Of the many strata that make up the stack of modern neuroscience this
thesis focuses at a relatively high level. Little will therefore be said about
firing rates, ion channels or genes and most discussion will be confined to
a computational examination of a particular hypothetical representation
within the human brain, that of face space.
1.2 The Nature of Mental Representations
Lying at the heart of cognitive science is the postulate of a representation
within the brain. An attractive view of the nervous system sees it imple-
menting a mapping between sensory inputs to adaptive motor outputs.
1For example in the fascinating, and therapeutically extremely promising, field of
machine-brain interfacing [Lebedev and Nicolelis, 2006]
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Because this cannot practicably be done using a look-up-table approach it
has been argued that the brain must construct abstract representations,
or symbols, of the world with which to compute evolutionarily fit ac-
tions [Gallistel and King, 2009]. Indeed, some have generalised the the-
sis to include all possible intelligent systems, natural and artificial, as in
the renowned PSSH (Physical Symbol System Hypothesis) of Simon and
Newel which asserted that a ”physical symbol system has the necessary
and sufficient means for general intelligent action” [Newell and Simon,
1976]. Not everyone has found this conception of intelligence altogether
persuasive as model for any intelligent system, least of all natural ones.
Practising physiologists for example, acquainted with the reality of ner-
vous systems might observe that, empirically, we do not find such physical
symbols when we look within actual brains [Shadlen et al., 2008]. Equally
certain philosophers, most notably Hubert Dreyfus, have argued that the
conceptual basis of the PSSH, and thereby its psychological dependant
cognitive science, is irretrievably misconceived [Dreyfus, 1992]. How-
ever the case against the PSHH (Physical Symbol System Hypothesis) was
perhaps most trenchantly put in Rodney Brook’s 1990 article ”Elephants
Don’t Play Chess” in which he argued that the PSSH had not only failed
at a practical level, yielding few if any tangible results in robotics and AI,
but was also, echoing Dreyfus, flawed in principle since, far from being a
good idea to explicitly represent or model the world,
”the world is its own best model. It is always exactly up to date. It
always has every detail there is to be known. The trick is to sense it appro-
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priately and often enough.” [Brooks, 1990].
This document principally describes attempts to model and experi-
mentally probe a hypothetical representation in the primate visual cortex,
so-called face space [Valentine, 1991b]. As such it falls squarely within the
compass of cognitive science, implying that the brain really does physi-
cally instantiate what is essentially a state space. At the beginning of the
work for this PhD certain criticisms of the classical paradigm underlying
cognitive science should have been accorded greater weight that was the
case, in particular those from the field of dynamical systems neuroscience
and contained within the so-called ”computation vs dynamics” debate.
Without dilating too greatly on the nuances of this debate, the basic issue
concerns whether biological systems really need construct explicit repre-
sentations or symbols in order to compute adaptive motor outputs. The
confidence of the author in the computational approach had been rein-
forced early on in his studies by Gallistel and King’s excellent book Mem-
ory and the Computational Brain in which they made, to my mind, a strong
case for a representational view of cognition [Gallistel and King, 2009].
Since then however this confidence has been undermined by the success,
and theoretical appeal, of a dynamical systems approach to understanding
biological computation, paralleled in robotics by the SED (Situated Em-
bodied Dynamic) framework [Pfeifer and Bongard, 2006]. Perhaps it is
most likely that the resolution to this debate will contain components of
both outlooks, as has been argued [Mitchell, 1995]. However, I am con-
scious that this research has been conducted as something of an unrecon-
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structed computationalist, to coin a phrase. Were one to undertake this work
again quite a different approach might be adopted. One more informed by
developments in dynamical systems neuroscience and the SED framework
within robotics.
1.3 The Origins of Valentine’s Conception of Face
Space
1.3.1 Precedents of Face Space
Face space has provided a general unifying, and perhaps dominant, frame-
work for much of the research done in the study of face perception over
the past two decades [Valentine et al., 2016]. Some light can be cast on the
ascendancy of face space as a framework by considering what it replaced.
In 1975 Hadyn Ellis published an influential review article in the British
Journal of Psychology entitled Recognizing Faces [ELLIS, 1975]. In it he
drew attention to the lack of theoretical underpinning then current work
in face recognition. Partly in response to this influential review, attempts
were made to furnish the field of face perception with a theoretically sat-
isfying account of face perception. Rightly or wrongly, many of the sub-
sequent efforts to provide such a theory were derivative, in the sense that
they sought to bring concepts from other fields of psychology to bear on
face perception. One such contribution was a popular model by Bruce and
Young [Bruce and Young, 1986], based on theoretical work in word recog-
nition [Morton et al., 1979]. However, evidence for this model centred on
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neuropsychological studies and a single diary study [Young et al., 1985],
complicating questions of empirical support. Added to this, Bruce and
Young’s model had nothing to say about the nature of the visual process-
ing of faces at a computational level, and little by way of experimental pre-
diction regarding the recognition of unfamiliar faces (as faces) [Valentine
et al., 2016]. Similarly, efforts to provide an explanatory framework based
on schema theory, a product originally of research into memory [Goldstein
and Chance, 1980], could account for some of the apparent properties of
face perception, such as the inversion effect, but failed to provide testable
predictions [Valentine et al., 2016]. In summary, then, throughout the
1970s and 1980s even the most popular of the then-current frameworks for
face recognition offered only fragmentary explanatory coverage and/or
generated few testable predictions required to arbitrate between compet-
ing theories. Moreover, the absence of a canonical theoretical framework,
naturally enough, prompted researchers to deploy in their experiments
extremely simple stimuli, such as those shown in figure 1.1. Such abstrac-
tions may have been well intentioned, being motivated by something like
a desire to isolate the essence of the phenomena, much as physics sought
to understand the motion of pendulums before whirlpools. However, the
effect of this heuristic in face perception was to throw out the baby with the
bathwater. Indeed, it is the high-dimensional natural variation in human
faces that constitutes the central computational challenge for a biological,
or indeed artificial, face recognition system [Valentine et al., 2016].
Despite the lack of a widely accepted paradigm within the field em-
pirical work continued over subsequent years, yielding several results
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which prepared the ground for Valentine’s conception of face space. Work-
ing within the context of schema theory Light, Kyra-Stuart and Hollan-
der [Light et al., 1979] published a study in 1979 in which they demon-
strated a distinctiveness effect across a wide range of exposure conditions.
In particular they showed that recognition accuracy from memory was
greater for faces rated as distinctive than for those rated as typical. In
keeping with schema theory the authors presented the effect of distinc-
tiveness in terms of deviation from a prototypical face. This result was
later confirmed by Valentine and Bruce and supplemented with a further
key finding, namely that the effect of distinctiveness (improved recogni-
tion) could be reversed (distinctive faces being more poorly recognised)
by changing the task demands [Valentine and Bruce, 1986]. In particular,
although consistent with Goldstein’s and Chance they found that distinc-
tive faces were indeed recognised faster than typical faces, yet when the
task was changed to classifying faces from among jumbled faces (i.e. non-
faces) distinctive faces actually took longer than typical faces to be clas-
sified. This result was at odds with schema theory-based accounts, since
it suggests what what enables a face to be recognised rapidly is not in-
trinsic to the mental representation itself (e.g. deviation from a definitive
schema), but highly dependant on the demands of the particular task.
To summarise, by the late 1980s one could describe the field as compris-
ing a raft of suggestive experimental findings, though lacking a coherent
and unifying theoretical framework. Schema theory was, evidently, not
the answer, and a more radical departure was required to achieve some-
thing like a unified account. Moreover, the desire for basic insights had
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led researchers to using increasingly simple and artificial stimuli, to such
an extent that it was debatable whether their stimuli any relevance at all
to face perception as a natural phenomenon.
Against this backdrop Valentine published in 1991 a paper wherein
he presented a framework to account for most of the then current em-
pirical findings as well as furnishing experimentalists with novel empiri-
cal predictions [Valentine, 1991b]. In Valentine’s conception face space is
viewed as a high dimensional space in which the dimensions of face space
are hypothesised to correspond to a broad and fairly indeterminate no-
tion of ”feature”. Both the precise dimensionality of face space (i.e. the
number of orthogonal features) and the nature of the ”features”, to which
the axes of face space correspond, are left undefined in Valentine’s origi-
nal conception. Having said that one influential interpretation is that the
axes of face space correspond to something very close to the eigenvectors
resulting from PCA (Principal Component Analysis) performed on faces
distributed in pixel space [Turk and Pentland, 1991, Bartlett et al., 2002].
Interestingly there is increasingly good empirical and theoretical support
that the brain does indeed perform computations like this in face recogni-
tion [Leibo et al., 2017].
1.3.2 Norm Vs Exemplar Face Space
An important consideration in the formulation of face space is the nature
of the metric governing similarity/dissimilarity. Debate has largely cen-
tred around two categories of models, know as exemplar models and norm
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models [Valentine et al., 2016, Lewis, 2004, Leopold et al., 2001]. In ex-
emplar models of face space the dissimilarity metric is a function of the
Euclidean distance within feature space between a particular face and
faces which has been seen previously (exemplars). Notice that this met-
ric is isotropic in the sense that the Euclidean distance is not dependent
on the frame of reference [Bishop, 2006]. In contrast a norm model im-
plies that the dissimilarity metric is dependent on the prototypical, aver-
age or norm face. Moreover, this metric is not isotropic, in that changes
in the radial vector (i.e. distance from the norm) represents changes in
distinctiveness, while changes in the tangential vector (orthogonal to the
radial vector) represent changes in identity. Perhaps rather surprisingly a
proposal for the actual form of this norm metric remains absent from the
literature [Lewis, 2004], making its intrinsic coherence rather difficult to
assess, quite apart from the question of empirical support.
Prominent in the norm-versus-exemplar debate have been results re-
lating to the phenomenon of adaptation within facial perceptions. In gen-
eral terms adaptation is a recalibration of a perceptual system following
exposure to a particular stimulus characteristic [Blakemore et al., 1970].
One of the earliest descriptions of the phenomenon for face perception
was provided by Lewis and Ellis who showed that displaying 30 differ-
ent views of an identity would slow recognition, compared to showing
just three views [Lewis and Ellis, 2000]. Subsequently adaptive effects
were demonstrated across a wide range of facial dimensions including at-
tractiveness [Rhodes G., 2003], personality [Buckingham, 2006] and iden-
tity [Leopold et al., 2001]. Leopold et al.’s 2001 paper is of particular inter-
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est because the results were framed as supporting a norm based account
of identity recognition. Using the same BFS model addressed in chapter
5, the authors showed that adaptation to a face produced the strongest
perceptual change (measured via perceptual thresholds for identity) for
identities lying on the same trajectory (i.e. on a line passing through the
adapted identity and the norm or origin of face space), as compared to
identities not on the same trajectory. Several points appear germane to
this claim. Firstly, the study assumed that the BFS model was a sound
model of human face space, the question addressed in chapter 5. From
the data presented there we can concede that this assumption is borne out
to a reasonable degree. A second point is that the inference from a psy-
chophysical finding to an assertion about the tuning properties of single
neurons relies on a chain of reasoning that can hardly be considered wa-
tertight. Leopold and colleagues did subsequently seek and find neurons
”tuned” to the norm [Leopold et al., 2006], although a major question con-
cerns whether this study was not subject to a strong confirmation bias.
On first sight it may seem that the norm account of face space provides
an immediate explanation of the curious caricature effect. According to
the norm-based account a caricature, corresponding to a vector with the
same direction but greater magnitude than the veridical face, is simply a
more distinctive version of the veridical face. Hence, the increased ease
of recognition. However, a concomitant finding is that the caricature ef-
fect is only present up to an exaggeration of 16%, after which it declines
and disappears [Lee et al., 2000]. As is discussed in subsection 1.3.3 Valen-
tine’s version of an exemplar based face space provides an elegant account
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of why this should occur, but it is not at all clear why this would occur
in a norm based account. On the contrary, it seems a clear prediction of
the norm account that this should not occur [Lewis, 2004]. In addition,
once one begins to consider other well established phenomena for which
a norm based model must account, in particular the other race-effect, it be-
comes difficult to avoid positing multiple norms, making the norm model
indistinguishable from exemplar models [Valentine and Endo, 1992,Lewis,
2004]. Furthermore, thanks to simulation studies, it is now clear that ex-
emplar models can account for many well established psychophysical ef-
fects, in addition to the findings of Leopold et al. [Ross et al., 2014]. Thus,
following the development of exemplar based accounts that can explain
phenomena such as the other race effect, the caricature effect, and the re-
sults of certain adaptation experiments, there has been reduced interest in
norm based accounts of face space. In subsection 1.3.3 Valentine’s version
of exemplar based face space is described and its implications for these
and other experimental findings discussed. There will be no further dis-
cussion of norm based accounts in this or subsequent chapters, and ref-
erences to Valentine’s face space should be interpreted as referring to his
exemplar based presentation. The explanatory implications of this account
are fleshed out in section 1.3.3
1.3.3 Explanatory Properties of Valentine’s Face Space
Valentine’s general framework is agnostic about the exact nature of the fea-
tures used in face perception. However, it makes definite assertions about
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the distribution of faces within face space, namely that this distribution
is (approximately) multivariate normal. That appears a very reasonable
assumption, primarily because it is an almost trivial observation that con-
tinuous properties of biological objects, such as height, weight, I.Q. etc.
tend to approximate a normal distribution. It is therefore a sensible null
hypothesis that the features utilised for natural face recognition, be those
what they may, are normally distributed.
Given then some distribution of faces within face space, Valentine main-
tains that the difficulty of recognition for some particular face depends on
1) the error of the encoding process, 2) the distance of the face from its
nearest neighbour and 3) the distance from the second nearest neighbour.
Later accounts, such as Byatt and Rhodes’ Absolute Coding Face Space [Lee
et al., 2000], argued that the distances from all other faces were relevant in
determining the ease of recognition.
Developmentally one can suppose that the neural architecture learns
adapts to the axes of variation one comes across in one’s environment,
resulting in a normal distribution in neural representational space that re-
flects one’s developmental environment. This is a crucial element of the
framework because it is known that children learn to recognise and dis-
tinguish those faces they encounter in their developmental environment,
and not faces in general [Gruter et al., 2008]. In something like the same
way children learn the features and statistics of the language in their envi-
ronment, not languages in general.
A further aspect of Valentine’s presentation is that dissimilarity in face
space is governed by a Euclidean metric. There is no requirement that this
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should be the case, and indeed solid evidence underpinning this assump-
tion is conspicuously absent. However, one relevant observation is that
over small distances many non-Euclidean metrics behave much the same
as a Euclidean metric [Lewis, 2004].
From these assumption, concerning the normal distribution of faces
and Euclidean metric, a number of experimental results can be explained,
including distinctiveness effects, caricature effects, developmental depen-
dencies, adaptation effects and, of particular note, the so-called ”other
race” effect.
The other race effect follows from the supposing that the axes of vari-
ation are different for different ethnicities. In that case a neural face space
adapted to Asian faces would reflect variation in Caucasian faces poor,
and all Caucasian faces would be essentially clustered together at an cen-
tripetal location. This would produce the impression of a distinctive eth-
nicity but would prevent good differentiation between individuals, ex-
actly as is observed [Richler and Gauthier, 2014].
The inversion effect is the observation that rotating a face 180◦results
in a catastrophic failure in perception and recognition of faces [Thomp-
son, 1980]. In keeping with the given account of the other race effect, just
as one is adapted to the ethnically associated variation present in one’s
environment, one is also adapted to the statistics and features of generally
upright faces, not inverted faces. Subsequent research has supported this
account, in particular with regards to the sensitivity to the orientation of
facial features [Psalta et al., 2014].
The distinctiveness effect described by Light et al. [Light et al., 1979],
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whereby distinctive faces are better recognised from among other faces
but more poorly recognised from among other non-face objects, can also
be elegantly accounted for. Distinctive faces are by definition found at
centripetal locations in face space, where there are fewer distractors than
at central locations in terms of density. In contrast, distinctive faces are
also, by construction, less typical than more typical faces, in that they are
more eccentric than the average face, explaining why they are less easily
identified as being faces from among non-face objects.
Related to distinctiveness effects is the caricature effect, a caricature be-
ing a more distinctive/eccentric version of a veridical face. In this frame-
work caricatures are more distinctive (i.e. more centripetal) versions of
veridical faces, and therefore also located in regions of lower distractor
density, making them easier to recognise [Lee et al., 2000]. The trade-off
is that as a caricature becomes ever more eccentric and enters regions of
lower and lower distractor density, it becomes increasingly dissimilar to
the veridical face and thus harder to identify. This jibes well with the find-
ing by Rhodes et al. [S., 1987] that the caricature advantage increased only
up to caricatures of 16%, after which the advantage declined.
1.3.4 Representation and Readout in Face Space
When considering face space as a functional representation one important
question is how information about facial identity is represented in a pop-
ulation of neurons. This is addressed in subsection 1.3.2, which concerns
the longstanding debate of Norm Vs Exemplar coding, and which is per-
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haps only well known to those acquainted with the literature around facial
perception and recognition. However, it is worth obtaining an overview of
some more general approaches to categorisation and considering their ap-
plication in face space. For example, although not originally developed
with explicit reference to faces, Nosofsky’s GCM (Generalised Context
Model) [Nosofsky, 2011] has been applied to understanding face recog-
nition, by considering it as categorisation of a face to a particular iden-
tity [Valentine, 1991a]. Briefly, given some probe, the probability of the
probe belonging to some identity/category is computed by measuring its
similarity to exemplars of that identity, divided by the sum of similari-
ties over all other identities. A problem faced by this model, as for the
case of the norm based model discussed in subsection 1.3.2, is that it is
unable to account for the falling off of the caricature effect beyond a cer-
tain eccentricity, and instead predicts a monotonically increasing carica-
ture effect. This cannot very well be correct for the simple reason that as
eccentricity increases the face will eventually stop looking like a face at
all, let alone a more recognisable caricature of a particular identity. A sec-
ond problem is that a GCM based approach produces a distribution over
all identities, that lacks the winner-takes-all quality of common experience,
illustrated most vividly by bistable phenomena such as the Necker cube.
An interesting question concerns whether different perceptual modalities
ultimately employ the same algorithmic principles as one another, ver-
sus the possibility that uniquely adapted representational system. Might
there not be then, in addition to face space, a ”car” space, a ”word” space
and and ”animal” space? Just as faces can morph and merge, apparently
25
seamlessly from one identity to another, many natural categories display
similar properties. Experimentally, it can be shown that a statement such
as A robin is a bird will be assented to more rapidly than the statement A
penguin is a bird, because, it is argued, robin represents a more prototypical
exemplar of the category bird [Rips, 1973]. This may be seen as analo-
gous to the finding that more prototypical faces are recognised as faces
more rapidly as faces than distinctive faces [Valentine and Bruce, 1986].
Some of the shortcomings of the GCM and other generalised approaches
to categorisation applied to face perception, have been address by more
recent modelling efforts. For example, Lewis’s face-space-R [Lewis, 2004]
builds on the basic assumptions of a Euclidean metric and a normal dis-
tribution of exemplars within face space. However, the model includes an
activation function for each known identity and a subtractive term based
on the activity of all other identities, effectively instantiating a competi-
tive process whereby at most one identity can have a positive response.
Thus, given some probe identity, if there is no overall positive response
the model essentially returns an unfamiliar face response, whereas if there
is an overall positive response to a known identity (and there can be no
more than one positive response), then that identity is returned and the
probe is recognised. Thanks to the explicit formulation of the face-space-
R model it is possible to perform simple simulations, which demonstrate
basic psychophysical phenomena such as distinctiveness effects and the
caricature effect. Lewis also performed high dimensional simulations in
face-space-R, with realistic numbers of exemplars, allowing him to obtain
an (empirically constrained) estimate of the dimensionality of biological
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face space of between 15 and 22 dimensions. It should be noted however
that other approaches can produce estimates suggesting a much higher di-
mensionality (e.g. [Chang, 2017]). As will be seen in chapter 2 the model
therein described is inspired in part by the class of drift diffusion mod-
els that have displayed such explanatory power, both regarding distribu-
tions of reaction times in psychophysical experiments and the electrical
behaviour of neurones [Romo, 2012, Beck et al., 2008, Shadlen et al., 2008].
While much of this work has utilised unidimensional stimuli, such as the
directional coherence of random dot stimuli, there has also been attention
paid to the relationship between features in the context of multidimen-
sional stimuli, which must surely be of relevance for a representational
space whose dimensionality few researchers would estimate to be lower
than double figures (e.g. [Lewis, 2004]). Of particular interest is the issue
of dependancy between the dimensional features and whether the brain
takes advantage of such dependencies when they are present. A broad
basis of work in this field suggests that the brain does indeed take advan-
tage of such dependencies, when they exist, demonstrated behaviourally
by the distribution of reaction times among other things [Wenger, 2001].
In Valentine’s conception of face space facial features are distributed in
a jointly normal fashion. If the axes of face space are furthermore deter-
mined by something close to PCA [Turk and Pentland, 1991], as recent
neurophysiological evidence strongly suggests [Chang, 2017] then the de-
pendencies investigated by Wenger, Townsend and colleagues may not be
relevant, since these conditions, strictly speaking, imply independence.
Given the preceding observations it seems clear that Valentine’s con-
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ception of face space has much in common with work done in other fields
of psychology. However, it does appear that some modifications is re-
quired, as with face-space-R, if the basic findings relating to caricature ef-
fects, distinctiveness effects and adaptation are to be explained.
Stepping down the hierarchy of explanatory accounts one is forced
to consider biologically plausible mechanisms that could instantiate for-
mal descriptions of face space. The properties of individual or popula-
tions of neurons, such as spike adaptation, may be helpful in accounting
mechanistically for dynamic phenomena such as psychophysical adapta-
tion [Clifford et al., 2007]. Equally, whatever the neural substrate of face
space, to be useful the information must be made available to other re-
gions of the brain (e.g. motor regions), so another question concerns how
that information is read out of one neuronal population and into another.
Simplistically, one might suppose that the neuronal face state space is in-
stantiated by a simple rate code, with specific neuronal populations rep-
resenting the axes of face space. In this scenario axonal projections to an
otherwise segregated neuronal population would make that information
available elsewhere for use in computation. More sophisticated models,
for example utilising oscillations and so-called communication through co-
herence, can also be adduced and are an active areas of experimental and
theoretical work [Fries, 2015, Buzsaki, 2006]. Relating to the focus of this
thesis chapter 4 presents a Bayesian account of the inferential process be-
hind face perception, subsequent to which (section 4.7) some fascinating
recent work in entomology is discussed. This work, by Seeley and col-
leagues [Seeley et al., 2012] suggests there may be deep commonalities
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between swarm intelligence and neuronal computation, such as that un-
derlying face perception. This possibility is discussed in chapter 4.
Despite the intrinsic interest and importance of connecting computa-
tional and neurophysiological accounts, this thesis, beginning with chap-
ter 2, primarily concerns the question of what algorithm is used to update
the representation of facial identity over time. To couch this in Marr’s
classic framework this model addresses the problem at the algorithmic
or representational level, not the level of neurophysiology and mecha-
nism [Marr, 1983]. The concept of face space is, for the most part, treated
purely as a representation, without recourse or reference to adjacent struc-
tures and functions. Face space’s function is accordingly assumed to be to
make available information to the rest of the brain about the face being cur-
rently foveated. In chapter 2 a dynamical state space model is presented
in which it is assumed that the current state constitutes an estimate of the
face being foveated. That is to say that the state is a representation of
the foveated face. It tells the rest of the brain which face is present in the
environment. Of course a central question in neuroscience is how a rep-
resentation in one region of the brain is accessed by another, but on this
question the model itself is silent.
1.3.5 Face Space as a Flexible Framework
Although it is not a necessary implications of Valentine’s work, the work-
ing assumption of most scientists in this field is that face space is a high di-
mensional space, certainly well beyond the three dimensions of Euclidean
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space within which visualisation and intuition may be relied upon to some
extent [Burton and Vokey, 1998]. As already discussed, empirical estimates
of the dimensionality of face space can only be made in the context of a
model of the computations supporting face recognition, but such studies
generally support the idea that dimensionality cannot be less than double
figures [Sirovich and Meytlis, 2009, Lewis, 2004].
Given this vagueness about the number and indeed nature of the di-
mensions of face space, a durable aspect of Valentine’s conception is its
agnosticism concerning the precise dimensionality and specification of the
feature space relevant to face perception. This means that it can accommo-
date a wide array of feature models. Valentine’s 1991 paper asserts that
many of the properties of face perception, and in particular those concern-
ing distinctiveness, inversion, and recognition, could be parsimoniously
accounted for by simply supposing such a high dimensional represen-
tation is utilised, irrespective of the exact nature or number of the axes
within it. As such, Valentine’s face space can be construed as nothing
more than a general framework, lacking in details. Alternatively it can
be viewed as a judicious and limited claim about the nature of face space,
given some very reasonable sounding assumptions about the task within
which it performs a role (face perception and recognition) and the nature
of the data it must work with (faces under variation in background, pose,
lighting etc.).
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Figure 1.1: The absence of a coherent and comprehensive theoretical framework
prior to the advent of Valentine’s conception of face space [Valentine et al., 2016]
in combination with the evident complexity of natural variation in faces, both
between and within individuals (due to pose and lighting for example), led to
the use of highly simplified schematic stimuli in experiments. Yet arguably, such
stimuli simplified the phenomena so much that they no longer represented one
of the central computational challenges of face recognition, the inherent high-
dimensional complexity of natural variation.
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1.4 The Bayesian Brain
A Bayesian account of perception typically begins with a nod to Reverend
Bayes and a quotation from the nineteenth century polymath Helmholtz
who held that the brain performs Bayesian reasoning by a process of ”un-
conscious inference”. While a pleasing if hackneyed trope, careful exam-
ination suggests the attribution to be rather tenuous [Westheimer, 2008].
A more prosaic and plausible account sees probabilistic ideas percolating
into the mainstream of psychological and neuroscientific thinking through-
out the latter half of the 20th century, from within and without neuro-
science, through the pioneering work of figures such as Horace Barlow
[Barlow, 1961] and E. T. Jaynes [Jaynes, 1988]. In any case, this approach
to the study of mental processes has only increased in prevalence over the
past 30 years and nowadays represents a major theme in modern brain
science.
The essence of Bayesian inference is that it provides a principled way
to combine disparate sources of information. Using it, one can incorpo-
rate new information into what was already believed about some aspect
of the world, say the bias of a coin. More biologically, a predator might ob-
tain both visual and subsequent auditory information about the location
of its prey, which it has to combine to achieve the optimal estimate of the
prey’s location. Mathematically the information is encoded in the form
of a prior probability distribution and a likelihood function, the latter of
which represents something like the ”plausibility” of the data considered
in the context of a model of its generation. In the terminology of the field
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one obtains a posterior distribution (updated beliefs) about some aspect
of the world by combining the prior distribution (previous beliefs) with
the likelihood function (plausibility of the new information under some
model). If we denote the new information, or data, by D and the relevant
aspect of the world by θ this general concept can be expressed in the form
of the canonical Bayes’ theorem
P (θ | D)︸ ︷︷ ︸
posterior
∝ P (D | θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
likelihood
P (θ)︸︷︷︸
prior
(1.1)
An appealing aspect of this formalism is that since both the poste-
rior and the prior are well defined probability distributions the output
of one application (a posterior) can be inputted to a second application
(in the form of a prior). Thus in an algorithmic sense this formalism is
perfectly suited to integrating the stream of data that a behaving organ-
ism requires to obtain up-to-date estimates of the state of the world, and
thereby select adaptive motor plans. This approach, whereby incoming
data is recursively integrated with previous knowledge using Bayes’ the-
orem, is known as recursive Bayesian estimation or Bayesian filtering and
finds applications across many disparate fields from engineering to lin-
guistics [Simo, 2013].
How much evidence is there that something like this actually happens
in behaving organisms? There is now a very significant body of evidence
that nervous systems do, at least in certain circumstances, approximate
Bayesian inference. Figure 1.2 is reproduced from a paper published by
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a leading lab in this area and illustrates the kind of non-uniform natural
statistics for which a Bayesian approach to a task, in this case edge ori-
entation estimation, would be well suited. A feature of work in this area
is the use of perceptual illusions and biases which have been described
and studied in the psychological literature over the past century or more.
Part of the elegance and appeal of a Bayesian account of perception is
that many perceptual biases can be understood as ”features” rather than
”bugs”. Indeed it turns out that bias is typically the price that must be paid
in reducing the variance of an estimator, the so-called bias-variance trade-
off. Such a bias is found in the estimation of edge orientation where people
tend to estimate edges to be closer to vertical or horizontal than they in fact
are. By supposing that a Bayesian process of inference underlies this task
performance, and the biases therein, Girshick and colleagues were able to
show that the prior required to explain such a bias corresponds extremely
well with that implied by the statistics of natural scenes [Girshick et al.,
2011]. This correspondence is displayed in figure 1.3. In section 1.3.4 the
issue of neural mechanisms was touched upon and this is no less an issue
for Bayesian theories of the brain. For it would seem that the brain must
represent probability distributions, either explicitly or implicitly (e.g. be-
ing able to sample from them), if Bayesian inference is to be at all possi-
ble [Fiser, 2010]. There is now a large body of theoretical and increasingly
experiemtal work showing how a Bayesian inferential process could be
implemented, for example by utilising local lateral inhibition [Bill et al.,
2015, Berkes P, 2011].
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Figure 1.2: The non-uniform distribution of edge orientation in natural scenes.
Left panel: a natural scene. Red dots mark the points where edges have been de-
tected and their orientation extracted algorithmically using standard techniques
from machine vision. Right panel: the distribution of orientations is far from
uniform, showing modes at the so-called cardinal orientations (vertical and hori-
zontal). From [Girshick et al., 2011].
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Figure 1.3: The priors extracted from a Bayesian model of the experimental
data obtained from subjects making orientation judgements concerning Gabor
patches. The left panel shows the extracted prior for a single subject (S1) in black
and the environmental prior in grey (obtained by analysis of natural scenes). In
the right panel the extracted priors across all 5 subjects have been pooled to ob-
tain a prior for the mean subject (black), which as can be appreciated corresponds
well to the environmental prior (grey). From [Girshick et al., 2011].
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Having established that the brain does indeed use, at least approxi-
mate, Bayesian inference for low level perceptual task, such as edge orien-
tation, a natural question is whether the brain is in general a Bayesian ma-
chine. Does the brain for example use a form of Bayesian inference for per-
forming identification at the level of whole objects such as cups, comput-
ers, phones and indeed faces? And do nervous systems deploy a Bayesian
mechanism for selecting the next action that should be taken? Increasingly
the field is coalescing around an affirmative answer to these questions in
which action and perception are views as complementary limbs of a single
Bayesian process, aptly described as Bayesian action and perception [Fishel
and Loeb, 2012]. This account implies that the the next action is selected
so as to provide the maximum amount of sensory information, so that for
example the pattern of saccadic eye movements that a person naturally
performs when perceiving a face should, in the context of an identification
task, maximise the amount of identity information extracted. Interestingly,
this prediction is borne our by experiment [Or and Eckstein., 2015], sug-
gesting that the identification of faces represents a particular instance of a
more general strategy. Notwithstanding, it deserves mention that several
respected detractors have argued against this thesis, for example arguing
that Bayesian decision making is fundamentally flawed as an approach
to general intelligence (aka ”stong” AI) because it is limited to induction
and extrapolation, as opposed to creative hypothesis formation [Deutsch,
2012].
In chapter 4 a model of face perception is presented, which supposes
that the brain utilises the prior distribution of faces within face space in in-
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ferring facial identity. The model is rather coarse in the sense that both in-
formation and the effect of noise are encoded in the form of (self-conjugate)
Gaussian pdfs, which are combined with one another in order to obtain a
(Gaussian) posterior distribution. This assumption simplifies the mathe-
matics involved considerably since it ensures that we need only deal with
Gaussians, which can be combined relatively simply. This model is of
course not intended to be a realistic representation of the computations
involved in face perception. Indeed many of the assumptions implicit in
it, such as explicit representation of probability distributions, are fairly im-
plausible. It is rather meant as a demonstration that the oddities within the
experimental data presented in chapter 3 can be understood as a natural
consequence of probabilistic inference within face space. That is, devi-
ations from what we might consider ”correct” perception can instead be
understood as functional consequences of a system tuned to perform prob-
abilistic inference by utilising informative priors defined over the relevant
state space (face space).
1.5 Summary
Face space has then, as intended, provided a ’useful heuristic framework’
over the past two decades [Valentine, 1991b] . However the model itself
has changed little, and has not been fully exploited. In particular there has
been little attempt to model its temporal dynamics, despite the fact that
many standard experimental approaches to face perception rely on inher-
ently temporal phenomena, most conspicuously that of adaptation. This
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is the subject of chapter 2 in which a model of temporal integration is de-
veloped, based on the method of exponential smoothing, a workhorse of
the statistics and signal processing communities since the mid 20th cen-
tury [Chatfield, 2003]. This method encapsulates the intuition that more
recent evidence should be weighted more heavily than older evidence and
allows us to conceptualise face space as a simple dynamical system where
the current perceptual ’state’ corresponds to a point estimate obtained by
exponential smoothing. Surprisingly, this elementary model is capable of
accounting for canonical and apparently complex data, such as the skewed
distributions of reaction times found in 2-alternative forced choice exper-
iments (section 2.6 and reference [Ratcliff and Smith, 2004]). Applying
this simple model to face space one obtains clear predictions about how
percepts should behave when a particular sequence of faces is presented.
Chapter 3 describes how key predictions of this model have been scruti-
nised experimentally, showing results which contradict it at a fairly fun-
damental level, but revealing a novel psychophysical effect in so doing.
In designing and performing experiments the work of Thomas Vetter
and colleagues in Basel has been invaluable [Paysan et al., 2009, Blanz
and Vetter, 1999]. Their 3D generative model of face shape and texture
offers one a high dimensional face space akin in many respects to the
psychological construct proposed by Valentine [Valentine, 1991b], except
that by implication they specify the computations defining the axes of
face space, whereas Valentine is agnostic about their precise nature. This
Basel Face Space (BFS) model has been leveraged throughout my investi-
gations and has been of utility in both designing and conducting experi-
38
ments. It has also been pivotal to the work of many others [Houlsby et al.,
2013, Learned-Miller et al., 2006, Wang and Lai, 2011]. Like this preceding
work, the conclusions of chapter 3 depend on the assumption that BFS is a
satisfactory approximation of human face space. In chapter 5 this assump-
tion is itself examined, by comparing human similarity judgements to Eu-
clidean distance within BFS, and found to be wanting in certain respects.
Of course it comes as no great surprise to find that BFS is an imperfect ap-
proximation of biological face space, which after all exhibits a considerable
degree of variability attributable to individual difference [Herzmann et al.,
2010]. Of perhaps more interests is the finding, described in chapter 5, that
the assumption of isotropy is substantially incorrect. Consistent with this,
recent work has suggested some interesting possibilities for why face space
may be anisotropic, beyond the contention that Basel Face Space is a ’bad’
model of human face space. One interesting suggestion is that individuals
build up complex, task-specific prior distributions, which may be highly
non-Gaussian and/or anisotropic in form [Houlsby et al., 2013]. Such a
possibility is attractive also since it provides a natural account of certain
phenomena such as the ”other race effect” [Behrman and Davey, 2001].
Finally, this thesis falls into two main sections which, while related, can
be considered in relative isolation from one another. The first, comprising
chapters 2 to 4, presents attempts to build a simple model of temporal
integration within face space, to test this model using a psychophysical
approach, and to then reconcile the data with a new model centred on a
Bayesian framework. The second, comprising chapter 5, is more straight
forward, in that it seeks to compare and contrast the widely used Basel
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Face Model (BFM) with human face space by comparing ”BFS-distances”
(measured as Euclidean distance in parameter space) with human dissim-
ilarity judgements (measured psychophysically). Insofar as there is any-
thing of worth contained within this document, this second section may
be felt to be of more use to other researchers. However, the first section is
more my own in both conception and execution and should be considered
the kernel of my submission, warts and all.
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2
A Normative State Space Model of
Temporal Integration in Primate
Face Space
In this chapter I conceptualise face space as a state space and de-
velop a simple model of temporal integration based on exponential-
smoothing, arguing that this is consistent with physiological data as
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well as being supported, in a normative sense, by a sound body of
statistical theory. The next section deals with some empirical pre-
diction of the model showing, firstly, that the ”long tail” of human
reaction-time distributions falls out naturally and, secondly, that the
model makes firm predictions about what percept subjects should
have when a series of identities are presented in quick succession.
These predictions form the basis of the experiments described in chap-
ter 3
2.1 Preliminary Comments on Modelling Objec-
tives
Prior to describing the state space model, with which this chapter is chiefly
concerned, it is important to motivate its construction in terms of what it
does and does not seek to explain. In this case the principal objective is
to address the question of the temporal integration of identity information
in face space. The world is dynamic, and facial identity changes as one
foveates from one face to another. Does face space reset somehow follow-
ing each saccade, so that the new task is approached, as it were, with a
clean slate? Or does information from one inter-saccadic epoch bleed into
adjacent epochs?
It is far from obvious what the optimal strategy would be in the context
of face perception, or indeed for almost any other domain, as attested to
the large body of theoretical and applied work coming out of the academic
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field known as Time Series Analysis [Chatfield, 2003]. Later in this chapter I
will draw out a simple prediction of the model, namely that when two face
stimuli are alternated according to some duty cycle, the percept experi-
enced by the subject will be a linear interpolation between the two stimuli.
It may be objected that this is ”obvious”, because for example, this is pre-
cisely what takes place in a movie. To this there are at least three relevant
observations. The first is that in chapter 3 results are presented of experi-
ments testing this very prediction of linear interpolation, yet the results do
not support the linear prediction and we observe a marked bias towards
the origin of face space. So, far from being obviously true, the prediction is
demonstrably false. The second is that the literature on ambiguous or con-
flicting stimuli, such as bistable stimuli like the well known Necker cube,
demonstrates that the brain typically does not interpolate linearly, but in
contrast switches in a highly non-linear, stepwise and stochastic fashion
between interpretations [Wilson, 2001]. The third is that the state space
model presented in this chapter is capable of dealing with any sequence
of stimuli. Suppose we have several faces presented in some random or-
der, sampled sequentially and with replacement, say, from a multinomial
distribution. What now is the obvious percept? It is very hard to say. In
contrast, the state space model advanced in this chapter is capable of pro-
ducing a precise prediction for any sequence of inputs.
Accordingly, the model described in this chapter is conceived as a spec-
ulative hypothesis, to be tested empirically. As alluded to in chapter 3, the
model will be shown to offer a poor account of the experimental data.
However, the model is not conjured out of thin air, and is based on a
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widely utilised statistical approach to temporal integration, exponential
smoothing [Chatfield, 2003]. This technique captures the intuitive idea
that as information becomes older and older it contains less and less in-
formation about the current state of affairs. Note that this need not be the
case, for example in the case of a periodic signal, but it seems a reasonable
assumption for the majority of ecologically valid situations.
In focusing on the question of how information is integrated over time
one is of course neglecting many other worthy questions. For example,
what is the readout mechanism? Or to put it another way, how is the rep-
resentation used to infer which of all possible identities is present? This
question could form the basis of another thesis entirely. Notwithstanding,
it is important to demonstrate that the model could in principle accommo-
date at least some readout mechanism. Therefore, following Shadlen and
others [Palmer, 2005], in section 2.6, it is shown how a log-odds race model
of decision making can be very naturally superimposed onto the proposed
model of temporal integration [Fetsch et al., 2014]. Moreover, the model
produces the classical skewed distribution seen in two alternative forced
choice data [Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008]. As far as can be determined from
extensive literature searches, two-alternative forced-choice reaction-time
distributions in face recognition have not been explored experimentally,
but there seems to be no obvious prima facie reason to expect facial stimuli
should yield different results from the many other categories of stimuli in
which the models have been tested. Within this race-to-threshold frame-
work for decision making one sees all the complexity of decision mak-
ing displayed, demonstrating how ”false identifications” can and will be
44
made (see figure 2.7), depending on the degree of intrinsic and perceptual
noise. Additionally, by setting the decision thresholds relatively high (or
equivalently, the strength of evidence low) one can easily imagine a sit-
uation in which no recognition threshold is passed, corresponding to the
situation in which a new face/identity is observed.
An equally important property of any model of face space is its ability
to model the process of learning, and by doing so replicate the many well
established effects associated with this process in face perception. Promi-
nent examples include distinctiveness effects, the so-called other-race ef-
fect, the caricature effect, and adaptation. Although they have not in ev-
ery case been modelled out and simulated, it is clear that a race model
could easily capture many of these properties, such as those distinctive-
ness effects discussed in some detail in section 1.3.3. It has however been
shown that the model can display the properties of adaptation and prim-
ing, which are prominent in the face space literature and probably medi-
ated by a common mechanism [Walther et al., 2013]. These effects emerge
given the simple assumption that the origin, or norm, is determined by
essentially averaging the actual faces encountered in the environment, a
process referred to as stimulus matching. Further explication and simula-
tion are presented in subsection 2.6.3.
To summarise, while the focus of this modelling exercise is upon the
temporal integration of information, it is nevertheless important to demon-
strate that the model can be extended to core experimental phenomena,
such as priming and adaptation. Thus, there are many directions in which
this model could be enriched and extended, but its focus, and the primary
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phenomenon probed through simulation and subsequently experiment, is
the temporal integration of information in face space.
2.2 Facespace as a State Space
Suppose that there exists a space within which the particular characteris-
tics of an individuals face allow it to be positioned uniquely, known in the
literature as face-space [Valentine, 1991b]. Each facial identity occupies
some position in this face space and the axes of face-space correspond to
those attributes or features used to differentiate faces from one another.
There is debate about what these axes correspond to but for the immedi-
ate purposes it matters only that some normed vector space exists [Callier
and Desoer, 1991].
Within this space it is supposed that each point corresponds to a par-
ticular identity 1, this being what is commonly meant by face space. At the
origin of these axes, is the norm or average face. The scheme is illustrated
for 2D in figure 2.2.
1And the set of points within some neighbourhood all correspond to a single identity.
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Figure 2.1: Face space in 2D. Taken from [Leopold et al., 2001]
2.3 State Space Model of Face Representation in
the Primate Brain
It is likely that face space, as utilised in the brain, is very high dimensional.
We suppose that this face space can be thought of as a state space for the
apparatus used by the brain for face perception. To be in the condition
of perceiving a face is, by assumption, to be in some state or position, P ,
within this space. The position, P , can equally be thought of as a particle,
which can move through face space. P then denotes ’position’, ’particle’
and ’percept’, as within this psychological model these are just different
ways of looking at the same thing.
If P is required to move to some point in space corresponding to an
identity when a face is seen, where should it optimally be located as a
starting point? The answer depends on the prior distribution of faces.
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Supposing that facial characteristics are distributed normally along each
axis with a mean of ~0, then the optimal position (i.e. that facilitating the
shorted possible route to an identity-point on average) is at the mean, ~0 in
this case. In statistical terms, if we think of P as a random variable, this is
the expectation of P , which is identical to the mean. The particle P should
then be located at the origin in face-space, and we may note in passing that
this location also corresponds to the average face, the so-called norm. Thus
the norm occupies no special status in this scheme beyond its statistical
significance (the mean of a multivariate Gaussian N (~0,Σ) ).
We can now adduce a simple scheme in which the particle P ’s position
in space at time t is described by a vector p. We can move P around this
space by performing linear operations such as addition and multiplication
on this vector.
Suppose that when a face, say face A, is present in the field of vision,
at each time step a perceptual vector containing information about A’s
location in facespace, fAt , is computed by the brain2. Previous perceptual
vectors fAt−1,...,T are combined so as to determine a new position for particle
P . Naively, this might simply be an average over some temporal window.
So,
Pt = pt =
1
T
(
fAt−1 + f
A
t−2 + . . .+ f
A
t + . . .+ f
A
t−T
)
(2.1)
Where t indexes the timestep, and T is the size of the temporal window,
2The superscript here denotes the ”true” identity, or noiseless perceptual input, of a
particular face, and is not an exponent. lower-case superscripts, e.g. xn, denote expo-
nents, while vector notation such as transpose is written in upper-case bold, e.g.fT
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in terms of timesteps, over which we average. In this formulation, when
face A is presented, p will evolve over T timesteps to fA, which we might
call an identity-point, as illustrated in figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Trajectory of particle P within 2D face space over 1 second, using a
moving average window of 100ms. P begins (green asterisk) at the origin, stimu-
lus onset occurs at 250ms, lasts for 500ms after which P evolves back to the origin
(in the absence of input). The attractor corresponding to face A, fA, is shown for
the duration of the input (from 250ms to 750ms) in magenta.
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So far we have supposed that information is uniformly weighted across
a temporal window, known as a moving average in statistics, and reflected
in the uniform 1
T
factor in 2.1 weighting the current perceptual input’s
contribution to the estimate pt. A natural thought, however, is that more
recent information may typically be more useful that temporally distant
information, since it may correlate more strongly with the current state of
the (changing) world. We can accordingly define a parameter τ , where
0 < τ < 1, whose effect is to weight more recent inputs to a greater or
lesser degree. Using this parameter consider the following series s
s = τ + (1− τ)τ + (1− τ)2τ + (1− τ)3τ + (1− τ)4τ4 + . . . (2.2)
Observing that this is a geometric series with first term a = τ and a
common ratio r = (1− τ) it follows that
s =
a
(1− r) =
τ
(1− (1− τ)) = 1 (2.3)
Applying these weights to a series of inputs then yields
pt = τ ft−1 + (1− τ)τ ft−2 + (1− τ)2τ ft−2 + (1− τ)3τ ft−3 + . . . (2.4)
And evidently
pt−1 = τ ft−2 + (1− τ)τ ft−2 + (1− τ)2τ ft−3 + . . . (2.5)
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So multiplying 2.5 by (1−τ) and subtracting the product from 2.4 yields
pt − (1− τ)pt−1 = τ ft−1 (2.6)
From which a recursive formulation follows straight forwardly i.e.
pt = (1− τ)pt−1 + τ ft−1 (2.7)
It can be appreciated that when τ is close to 0 p will be relatively unaf-
fected by the most recent input, whereas when τ is close to 1 p is largely
determined by the most recent input. Values in between naturally cor-
respond to intermediate weightings of recent inputs versus more tempo-
rally distant inputs. Notice that this formulation requires a neural mecha-
nism to store only one variable, which is recursively updated, a significant
consideration in terms of biological plausibility. Moreover, it will become
clear in section 2.3.3 why this formulation is particularly appropriate from
a normative perspective.
2.3.1 Individual Faces Define Attractors and Basins of At-
traction
It is an important feature of the dynamics of a proposed model of face
space that there be basins of attraction corresponding to any individual
face. An appealing feature of the proposed framework is that, given some
input, the whole of face space becomes a basic of attraction for that iden-
tity. There remains a degree of history dependence within the model, for
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example in the sense that if an input, say A, is preceded by an input, say
B, which is relatively remote in face space, such as an anti-face, then it will
take longer to evolve to the corresponding attractor than if B were closer
to A. However there cannot arise a situation in which preceding input
”locks” the future dynamics, analogous to an absorbing state in a Markov
chain. This can be seen formally as follows.
For some given constant input f , pt will always be closer to f than pt−1
since
pt = τpt−1 + ft−1 − τ ft−1 = τ(pt−1 − ft−1) + ft−1 (2.8)
That is to say, pt is a point falling τ ∗ 100% along the line connecting
pt−1 and ft−1. In addition it can be seen that f itself is a fixed point attractor
since
pt−1 = ft−1 → pt = τ ft−1 + (1− τ)ft−1 = ft−1 (2.9)
2.3.2 Noise and Variability
How does the model behave if, instead of a steady input, the model re-
ceives noisy input? Suppose that at each timestep ft ∼ N (~0,Σe)
Then by equation 2.7
pt = (1− τ)ft + τ(1− τ)f−1 + τ 2(1− τ)f−2 + . . . (2.10)
So the covariance is given by
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Cov[p0] = ΣP = (1− τ)2Σe + τ 2(1− τ)2Σe + τ 4(1− τ)2Σe + . . . (2.11)
Σe can then be removed from the summation leaving a geometric series
with the first term a = (1 − τ)2 and common ratio τ 2, and yielding the
following expression, 3
ΣP = Σe ·
∞∑
t=0
(1− τ)2τ 2t = Σe · (1− τ)
2
1− τ 2 (2.12)
It should now be possible to appreciate some of the underlying ratio-
nale for this scheme. Should the value of τ be set close to 0 the current
estimate is largely determined by the most recent input, the payoff be-
ing sensitivity and meaning that the current estimate will track changes in
the target variable with very little lag. It will however be very sensitive
to noise in the input (i.e. by equation 2.12 the variance will be relatively
large). We can combat the sensitivity to noise by setting the value of τ be
close to 1, so that temporally distant inputs are weighted more heavily, but
the (relatively low variance) estimate will then lag behind the true value of
the tracked variable. Thus there is an inevitable tension between the desire
for sensitivity and for noise resistance in our estimate, which is illustrated
in simulation in figure 2.4.
3Note that the sigma notation is overloaded in that it is being used to denote both a
covariance matrix (the smaller) and summation (the larger).
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2.3.3 Statistical Motivation of the State Space Model
Although we have so far developed the SSM in a relatively intuitive fash-
ion, we will now provide a statistical motivation by showing that it is
equivalent to a widely used technique from time series analysis called ex-
ponential smoothing. Suppose we have a time series for a variable x, from
time t = 1, . . . , T .
x1,x2, . . . ,xT (2.13)
In order to obtain an estimate of the current value of x simple expo-
nential smoothing [Chatfield, 2003] mandates the followsing recursive re-
lation.
xˆt+1 = αxt + (1− α)xˆt (2.14)
Comparison of equations 2.14 and 2.7 will make clear that the model
we have proposed for the integration of temporal information in facespace
is completely equivalent to exponential smoothing, where τ = 1 − α. It
may also be noted that exponential smoothing is a special case of a Kalman
filter [Chatfield, 2003] placing this approach within the broader context of
a sound probabilistic framework. This makes a good deal of sense since
the brain is here challenged with a similar task to a Kalman filter, namely
to estimate and track the value of a potentially dynamic variable using a
noisy time series.
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2.4 Continuous Dynamics for Face Space
The preceding description of the state space model of face space dealt in
discrete time steps, yet biological face space presumably possesses contin-
uous dynamics. It is straightforward to extract a continuous model from
the discrete one so far described, as follows. The vector describing the
change in the position p, for some constant input f , over a time step of size
δt is,
pt − pt−δt = τpt−δt + (1− τ)f − pt−δt (2.15)
So in the limit as t→ 0,
∇p = lim
δt→0
pt − pt−δt = (1− τ)(f − pt) (2.16)
Which can then straight forwardly be integrated to yield the general
solution
pt = f + C exp(−t(1− τ)) (2.17)
Where C is a constant vector.
If we then suppose that the position at time t = 0 is p0 (initial condi-
tions) then
C = p0 − f (2.18)
So that the particular solution describing the continuous dynamics within
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face space for a given input f and a starting position p0 is given as follows.
pt = f + (p0 − f) exp(−t(1− τ)) (2.19)
This equation describes the continuous dynamics of a particle in face
space. From our derivation it can also be appreciated that a physical sys-
tem with these dynamics, such as a population of face selective neurons,
would be in essence computing the continuous, exponentially smoothed
estimate of face identity. As has been observed previously this provides a
normative rationale for the observation that electrical recordings of neu-
rons do indeed display exponential dynamics [Yu and Cohen, 2009].
2.5 Illustrations of the State Space Model
Some illustrations of the model should help clarify its operation. Figure 2.3
shows the trajectory of p from the origin, the default initialisation point,
to an attractor, corresponding to a particular face.
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Figure 2.3: Illustrates the temporal evolution over time in 2D state-space without
noise. p begins at the origin (the norm) and evolves towards an attractor, marked
in magenta at each timestep, according to equation 2.7. The characteristic shape
of the trajectory derives from the fact that this is essentially a form of exponential
smoothing, so that the particle p ”decays” exponentially and asymptotically to
the attractor and then back to the origin at the offset of the stimulus. For the
purposes of illustrating the form of the dynamics τ is set rather high, at 0.975. cf.
figure 2.2
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Figure 2.4 illustrates a similar scenario but with the addition of noise
and six different values of τ . In the noisy condition with τ set to a rela-
tively low value P does not quite converge to the fixed point but instead
”rolls” noisily around in the basin of attraction. This effect becomes com-
paratively smaller as the value of τ increases towards 1, going from top
left to bottom right in the subplots of figure 2.4.
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In figure 2.5 we now have two stimuli presented sequentially, switch-
ing after 1000 timesteps, illustarting how the system re-converges on pre-
sentation of a new input to the system.
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Figure 2.5: Illustrates the temporal evolution of the model with a small amount
of noise and two stimuli (marked by magenta and red) presented successively. P
begins at the origin (the norm) and evolves towards an attractor corresponding
to the first stimulus (magenta), remains in its neighbourhood until time point
750, when the second stimulus is presented, to which the system then evolves.
At the offset of the second stimulus (red) P then returns to the origin where,
notwithstanding ongoing noise, it remains.
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2.6 Experimental Predictions for the State Space
Model
2.6.1 Distribution of Reaction Times
One of the principal experimental validations of the class of models known
as drift diffusion models is their ability to predict the positively skewed
distribution of reaction times in human subjects during, for example, forced
choice experiments [Romo, 2012]. This is illustrated in panel b of figure 2.6.
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Figure 2.6: The sDDM model and the distribution of reaction times. Panel a
shows the trajectory of evidence accumulation for many independent trials. Sev-
eral are depicted in colour for illustration. The signal is depicted by the red vector
marked Drift µ and its strength corresponds to the steepness of its gradient. The
threshold at which a decision is taken is marked by a pair of black lines equidis-
tant from the origin. Note that the level at which the thresholds are set is arbi-
trary in the absence of an objective function and indeed the positive and negative
threshold might conceivably be of different magnitudes. Panel b shows a fre-
quency plot of correct and incorrect trials, i.e. trials in which threshold B (correct)
or threshold -B (incorrect) was crossed first, versus reaction time. Of particular
note is the long tail, or right skew, present in both distributions. The fact that drift
diffusion models of decision making reproduce this signature form, a right skew,
as a natural consequence of their dynamics is considered by many to be a cogent
piece of evidence in their favour. From [Romo, 2012]64
The state space model can likewise reproduce these features of human
decision making. We integrate evidence across time by calculating an odds
ratio in the following way. If we suppose Gaussian probability distribu-
tions centred on the attractors, fA and fB, then we can calculate a condi-
tional probability (density) for pt at each time-step t. i.e.
p(pt|fA) = 1
σ
√
2pi
e−(pt−fA)
2/2σ2 (2.20)
And likewise, mutatis mutandis, for p(pt|fB). The log of the ratio of these
two probabilities
ln
(
P (pt|fA)
P (pt|fB)
)
(2.21)
at time t will therefore yield a positive or negative value depending
on P ’s relative proximity to the two attractors. This quantity, call it d, can
then be summed across time-steps and a ’decision’ triggered when some
arbitrary decision threshold, ±b, is crossed.
dt =
t∑
0
ln
(
P (pt|fA)
P (pt|fB)
)
(2.22)
This process is illustrated in figure 2.7 for 100,000 trials within the
model.
We can now reproduce the skewed distribution within our simulation.
Figure 2.8 illustrates a situation in which face A is presented in the pres-
ence of much noise. In this situation the noise has a significant impact on
P ’s trajectory, one of which is traced for illustration. It is worth noting that
the critical computation here, determining when the decision criterion has
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Figure 2.7: Reaction time distribution produced by the state space model for a
forced choice between a face (A) and an anti-face (B). The true signal, i.e the input
to the model, is A but this is corrupted by significant noise, so there is the pos-
sibility that the system is driven past the decision threshold for B before that of
A. Thus over the 100,000 simulated trials we obtain a distribution of correct and
incorrect trials, which of note displays the characteristic long tail (right skew)
found in human psychophysical data across multiple tasks [Usher and McClel-
land, 2001].
been surpassed in one direction or another, could be implemented in a bi-
ologically plausible way by a competitive neural network in which two
populations of neurons are driven by the two stimuli (faces) but mutually
inhibit one another [Usher and McClelland, 2001].
The distributions of reaction times, for correct and incorrect decisions,
are plotted in figure 2.7. While the results in figure 2.7 represent a simula-
tion with various hand-set parameters, the general form of the distribution
is invariant. This prediction can be mapped directly onto psychophysics,
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Figure 2.8: Two example trajectories for a simulate two-alternative forced choice
task in the exponential state space model. In the presence of significant noise, as
in this case, the trajectory of p is dominated by noise. Combined with the noise
there is however a weak signal in the direction of the ”true” input face (red),
which needs to differentiated from the corresponding anti-face (cyan). cf. figure
2.9
and to my knowledge has not been tested in the literature. In particular,
it is not adequate to merely present degraded faces and measure reaction
times. Since the level of internal noise in the neuronal accumulator is un-
known, and may even be close to 0 [Brunton et al., 2013], it is essential that
the stimulus be corrupted with significant noise, where significant means
of a comparable magnitude to the signal.
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Figure 2.9: Shown is the process of evidence accumulation for two simulated
trials, terminating when decision boundary ±b is exceeded (marked by the red
and cyan lines), for the SSM using a sequential probability ratio as a decision
criterion. Compare the two runs of the simulation shown here to the two drift-
diffusion random walks shown in figure 2.8
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2.6.2 Interleaved Presentation of Multiple Faces
What should be the effect of alternating between two different faces? If
the interval between the two is sufficiently long then it is clear that the
model will simply evolve to one attractor and then the other sequentially.
Likewise, perceptually one simply sees one face and then the other if the
period is sufficiently long. However, if the alternations are rapid should
one perceive a face intermediate to those two presented, or alternatively
should the percept alternate stochastically between the two as is found
with bistable stimuli such as the Necker cube? The predictions of the ex-
ponential state space model can be drawn out straightforwardly. Con-
sider some arbitrary sequence of two faces, fA and fB, beginning as say
B,A,A,B, . . . and continuing in a random fashion ad infinitum. In the
model this can represented as follows,
pt = (1− τ)fBt + τ(1− τ)fA−1 + τ 2(1− τ)fA−2 + τ 3(1− τ)fA−3 + . . . (2.23)
It can be seen that whatever the sequence, the weights determining the
contribution of each element of the sum to the particle position at time t,
pt, must sum to 1 since,
s = (1− τ) + τ(1− τ) + τ 2(1− τ) + τ 3(1− τ) + . . . = 1− τ
1− τ = 1 (2.24)
I.e. s is a geometric series with a = 1− τ and common ratio r = τ .
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We can then decompose s into a sum of weights for A and a sum of
weights for B,
s = sA + sB = 1 (2.25)
And finally, using linearity,
spt = s
AfA + sBfB = pt (2.26)
This will necessarily be a point on the line connecting fA and fB, since
in general for any vectors a and b, letting c = b− a and 0 < w < 1, a point
x falls on the line connecting a and b i.i.f.
x = a + wc = a + wb− wa = (1− w)a + wb (2.27)
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Figure 2.10: Where two faces (correspondong attractors marked in black and ma-
genta) are interleaved so that they are presented in an alternating pattern. pt be-
gins at the origin (green asterisk) and rapidly evolved towards a 2-cycle in which
it is ’suspended’ between the two attractors, situated at a point on the morph line
(marked in red for t=0) between the two attractors A and B. In this example the
duty cycle for face A is 50%, meaning that pt’s average position is halfway be-
tween the two attractors. Varying the duty cycle of A between 0 and 100% results
in a linear interpolation between A and B with respect to the average position
over time.
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It is a trivial extension of this result to demonstrate that for any se-
quence consisting of members of a set of M (perceptual) vectors, pt will
always occupy a point in an M − 1 hyperplane within RN (perceptual)
space.
We can now adduce a method for ”supsending” p at some arbitrary
point on the line between two faces as follows. Suppose at each timestep
we present either face A or B according to a Bernoulli distribution with
parameter p, i.e. ft ∼ Bern (p). Then the expectation of p is
E[p] =
∞∑
t=0
(
pfA(1− τ)τ t + (1− p)fB(1− τ)τ t) = pfA + (1− p)fB (2.28)
the RHS of which, by 2.25, is formally equivalent to the middle ex-
pression in equation 2.26. So, setting p to some value between 0 and 1
will ’suspend’ p a certain proportion, p, along the line from face A to B,
although for any actual sampled sequence p will typically shuttle stochas-
tically back and forth across the point E[p]. Again, it is straight-forward
to generalise this result to the case of multiple faces, where the multino-
mial distribution plays the role of the Bernoulli distribution. Nor need
we know from which probability distribution a sequence has been gener-
ated. For any given sequence for t = 0, . . . T we can simply compute the
expected value of p0 empirically as
p0 =
T∑
t=0
f it (1− τ)τ t (2.29)
Where i indexes over different perceptual vectors and i denotes the
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value at time t.
2.6.3 Stimulus Matching Accounts for Adaptation and Prim-
ing in State Space Model
It has already been observed in section 2.3 that the optimal position for
P to be located in face space is the origin, corresponding to the norm or
average face. How could a brain compute this location? One possibil-
ity is that the brain moves the origin of the approximate representation
to this location by taking a weighted average of the faces it is exposed
to, where the weighting is determined by some function of the duration
and/or frequency of presentation. That could be accomplished by a sim-
ple rule such as the following: if a face is present, move the origin of neu-
ral face-space towards the location of the current stimulus. This could of
course be implemented at many time-scales, but for now we consider a
single timescale.
In an influential adaptation study by Leopold and colleagues [Leopold
et al., 2001] subjects were tasked with identifying presented faces as a par-
ticular face, or its anti-face. After adaptation to a face subjects were pre-
sented with the norm, and were found to be more likely to classify it as the
anti-face, despite the norm being by definition equidistant in face-space
from both the face and anti-face. Adaptation to the anti-face resulted in the
opposite identification bias. In this sense adaptation can be said to have a
repulsive effect, since identification is biased away from the adapted stim-
ulus. In contrast, when a subject is primed to a stimulus such as a face,
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they are subsequently quicker to identify the face and do so more accu-
rately than they otherwise would. In this sense priming can be seen as
an attractive effect, since the stimulus is recognised faster and more accu-
rately post-exposure. It can seem therefore prima facie that priming and
adaptation are antagonistic to one another in that exposure to a stimulus
apparently both inhibits and facilitates future identification.
Figure 2.11 illustrates how stimulus-matching can explain both prim-
ing and adaptation simultaneously, consistent with evidence supporting
a common mechanism underlying both phenomena [Walther et al., 2013].
The simulation, illustrated in figure 2.11, mimics the design of Leopold
and colleagues [Leopold et al., 2001] and shows that the average face, the
norm, is found on the opposite side of the origin once adaptation with
stimulus-matching has occurred, explaining why the norm is more likely
to be identified as the anti-face post adaptation since, in the representa-
tional space, the norm is no longer at the origin, but effectively constitutes
a version of the anti-face. The priming effect, meanwhile, is explained by
the fact that the adapted stimulus now occupies a position closer to the
origin than pre-adaptation, and so the system evolves to the correspond-
ing attractor in fewer time steps when initialised from the norm (i.e. the
stimulus is recognised more rapidly).
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Figure 2.11: Illustration of adaptation to stimulus C (attractor in black). With no
stimulus present P remains (noisily) at the origin, which initially coincides with
the average face (attractor B in cyan). When stimulus C is presented (at t=3,000)
P evolves towards pCeq and remains there for the duration of the presentation (i.e.
from t=3,000 to t=5,999), during which time the origin of the representation shifts
towards pCeq at a constant rate. Note that subsequent to this the average face (B,
in cyan) is now on the opposite side of the norm from C, and on the same side of
the norm as the anti-face (A). Thus B is more likely to be identified as a version
of A than of B, at least under a norm based interpretation (i.e. a repulsive effect
of adaptation). In contrast C is now closer to the norm than previously, and so is
recognised more rapidly since the system evolve to the corresponding attractor in
fewer time steps. (n.b. A shift in the origin described by vector s is equivalent to
adding the vector −1× s to all the data points and keeping the origin stationary,
which is how the shift is depicted here).
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Thus, to summarise this section, by making the simple assumption that
the origin or norm in face space is determined by sampling from those
faces actually experienced and taking the smoothed mean of that sam-
ple, the model can immediately reproduce the central features of priming
and adaptation. Naturally, a very similar approach could be adopted to
account for the so-called other-race effect and many other psychophysical
phenomena.
2.7 Conclusion
I believe this simple normative model has much to offer, by way of ex-
planatory accounts of current results, but also in making novel predictions
for new experiments. However, there are certain phenomena, such as the
FFDE (Flashed Faces Distortion Effect) [Tangen et al., 2011] and my own
results described in chapter 3 which cannot, I believe even in principle, be
accounted for by this model. Perhaps then the most generous construc-
tion that can be put on it is that it represents a clear example of Popperian
science [Popper, 2002], yielding strong experimental predictions, which
(typically) turn out to be wrong.
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3
Experimental tests of the state
space model of facespace
This chapter concerns the design, methods and results of experiments
aimed at testing the predictions of the exponential model of temporal
integration, arrived at in chapter 2. The two experiments performed
are referred to as the DE (Dynamic Experiment) and CE (Contrast Ex-
periment). The results obtained in the DE contradict the predictions
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of exponential model and the results of the CE argue strongly that
this deviation from predictions is somehow a consequence of the dy-
namic nature of the stimuli used. These results set the scene for an
alternative Bayesian model of inference developed in chapter 4
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of the experiments described in this chapter was to test the
predictions of the normative model of face space dynamics developed in
chapter 2. To briefly recap, the model predicted that a stimulus consisting
of two rapidly alternating faces would yield an intermediate percept, rep-
resenting an interpolation along the morph line connecting the two faces
in face space. Moreover, it was shown that the position of the interpolation
on the morph line should be dictated by the duty cycle of the stimulus. As
discussed in section 2.1, it is not ”obvious” that the model should yield
a linear interpolation because (1) it turns out (as will be seen) that a lin-
ear interpolation is falsified experimentally (i.e. far from being obviously
true, it is demonstrably false)(2) the model can cater for input of arbitrary
complexity and (3) the literature on ambiguous stimuli provides ample
examples of profoundly non-linear percepts, such as the bistable Necker
cube. Finally, note that the choice of exponential smoothing is not arbi-
trary, versus some other form of smoothing say. On the contrary, as out-
lined in sections 2.4 and 2.3.3 there are sound normative [Chatfield, 2003]
and neurophysiological [Yu and Cohen, 2009] grounds for this hypothesis.
The fundamental hypothesis at stake then is as follows: does psychophys-
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ical data support a basic prediction yielded by supposing that face spaces
behaves like a state space in which an estimate of the current state is made
using exponential smoothing? In Results, section 3.3.2, it will be shown
convincingly that the actual findings were quite different from those pre-
dicted, and require the rejection or revision of the exponentially smoothed
state space model. Indeed, In the next chapter an alternative model is de-
veloped which does indeed account for some salient features of the exper-
imental findings, although at a considerable cost in terms of parsimony.
Notwithstanding, this supports the possibility that inference in face space
is, like much lower level perceptual inference, Bayesian in character.
3.2 Methods: General Approach
Experiments were performed on 20 subjects with normal vision and nor-
mal face perception. Experiments were written using the programming
language Matlab (R2010) and the package PsychToolBox [Brainard, 1997],
and were conducted in the MRC CBU in Cambridge, UK. Subjects, re-
cruited from the MRC CBU volunteer panel and ranging in age between
18 and 65, were paid £7 per hour, apart from four who were members of
the Kriegeskorte lab and were paid nothing. Experiments were run on the
Unit’s dedicated experimental desktop computers, using 25” by 43” moni-
tors (2560 x 1440 resolution), and running Windows 7. Subjects performed
the experiments sat at a normal desk, which the monitor at eye level in
front of them and at a distance of approximately 60cm, with the keyboard
on the desk between the monitor and the subject. There were two distinct
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experiments run for each subject in separate sessions, which I will refer
to as 1. the Dynamic Experiment (DE) (see subsection 3.2.1) and 2. the
Contrast Experiment (CE) (see subsection 3.2.2). In both the DE and the
CE experiments followed an interleaved design, whereby on each trial a
stimulus was presented according to parameters pseudorandomly sam-
pled from tables 3.2.1 and 3.2 respectively. Each trial parameter setting,
corresponding to a row in tables 3.2.1 and 3.2, was presented 10 times per
subject, resulting in 220 trials per session for the DE and 110 trials per
session for the CE. In both experiments the subject was required to manip-
ulate a 12cm x13cm ”matcher” face (which he could do with the keyboard
’o’ (left), ’p’ (right), ’q’(more centripetal), ’a’ (less centripetal)) on the right
so as to resemble a 12cm x13cm ”target” face on the left, which on any
particular trial consisted of two faces ”merged” by one of two methods,
corresponding to the DE and CE. For both the DE and the CE participants
were simply instructed to do their best to make the two stimuli (on the left
and right of the display) match as closely as possible. Subjects ere shown
the four keys ’o’ (left), ’p’ (right), ’q’(more centripetal), ’a’ (less centripetal)
used to manipulate the matcher stimulus, and a fifth key ’d’, which ter-
minated the trial. There was no time limit placed on subjects, but subjects
typically took 20-30 seconds per trial. Further details about the DE and CE
are given in section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. An example screen shot of the experi-
mental display is shown in figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: A (static) screenshot of the experimental display. In any condition
both the left and the right stimulus are variable. The stimulus on the left, the
target stimulus, ”merges” two identities, either by rapidly alternating between
two identities (the dynamic experiment, DE) or by superimposing two identities
with differential contrast (the contrast experiment, CE). The dominance of one
identity over the other is varied systematically according to the parameters of the
condition (see table 3.2.1 ). In either case the stimulus on the right, the matcher,
can be controlled by the subject so as to match the target stimulus. This amounts
to stepping around a grid-sampled 2D slice through face space which contains
the norm face as well as the two faces used in the target stimulus (see figures 3.2
and 3.3)
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3.2.1 Methods: Dynamic Experiment
As described in the general approach, section 3.2, in this experiment, the
CE, the subject was on each trial presented with a display on which two
stimuli (faces) were displayed side by side. One stimulus consisted of a
rapidly alternating pair of faces, with a period of either 100ms or 200ms.
The other ”stimulus” consisted of a single face which could be altered by
the subject by pressing keys ’o’ (left), ’p’ (right), ’q’(centrifugal), ’a’ (cen-
tripetal). By means of these 4 keys and beginning from a randomly chosen
initial point the subject was able to navigate around a randomly sampled
rectangular, 2D grid of faces. The grid was constrained to contain the aver-
age or norm face and the pair of faces being rapidly alternated in the first
stimulus. When the subject felt that he had found the best match from
among this grid he terminated the trial by pressing ’d’ (for done) and pro-
gressed to the next trial. The parameters of the next trial were then drawn
pseudo-randomly from table 3.2.1, so that this was an interleaved design
(as opposed to block design).
The temporal separation of the two faces was an important aspect of
the experimental design, and one that originates from the modelling de-
scribed in subsection 2.6.2. In the dynamic condition the two faces were
rapidly alternated on a timescale of 10 − 180ms. To unpack this, at duty
cycles of 0 and 100% a single face was present, since the ”second face” (at
duty cycle 0%) was presented for a duration of 0ms on each cycle. The
overall period of the alternation (i.e. the duration from the onset of A until
the offset of B) was either 100ms or 200ms, but for each period the actual
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duration of presentation was determined as a proportion of the overall pe-
riod. Within the relevant period the relative duration of presentation of A
versus B was varied in the proportions 0, 0.1, 0.2, ... , 0.9, 1, resulting in
22 different conditions considered from an abstract perspective, but in fact
only 18 distinct conditions, since conditions in which the relative duration
was either 1 or 0 were equivalent (i.e. a single face presented continu-
ously). The parameter values corresponding to the different experimental
conditions are tabulated in table 3.2.1. In those conditions where both al-
ternating faces were presented for a positive fraction of the duty cycle the
maximum duration any face was continuously present was 180ms and the
minimum 10ms. This is rapid enough that the faces do not appear distinct,
but coalesce into a single identity, albeit a slightly spectral and flickering
one with some of the subjective qualities of a stroboscopic lamp.
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Period (ms) Duration of A (ms) Duration of B (ms) Duty Cycle (%)
100 0 100 0
100 10 90 10
100 20 80 20
100 30 70 30
100 40 60 40
100 50 50 50
100 60 40 60
100 70 30 70
100 80 20 80
100 90 10 90
100 100 0 100
200 0 200 0
200 20 180 10
200 40 160 20
200 60 140 30
200 80 120 40
200 100 100 50
200 120 80 60
200 140 60 70
200 160 40 80
200 180 20 90
200 200 0 100
Table 3.1: A tabulation of the parameter values for each condition in the dynamic
experiment. The duty cycle in the last column is defined with respect to A. There
are 22 rows but conditions in which the duty cycle of stimulus A is 0% or 100%
are equivalent since in these cases the target stimulus is a static face, B or A re-
spectively.
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3.2.2 Methods: Contrast Experiment
This experiment was designed to be the same as the DE, described in sub-
section 3.2.1, except for the manner in which two faces were merged to
form the target stimulus on any trial. Rather than rapidly switching be-
tween two faces at the same spatial location, as in the DE, in the CE the
two faces were superimposed each with a contrast of between 0 and 100%,
such that the sum of the two values was always 100%. The contrast was
varied at increments of 10% resulting the parameter values in table 3.2.
Just as in the DE the subject was presented with a target stimulus on the
left and was required to navigate around a 2D grid of faces which con-
tained the norm face as well as the two faces used to construct the target
stimulus. Having terminated a trial by pressing the key ’d’ the parameters
of the next trial were likewise selected in a pseudorandom fashion from
those listed in table 3.2, so this was an interleaved design. Due to there
being fewer parameter permutations for the CE (see table 3.2) than for the
DE (cf. table 3.2.1) the sessions were shorter. Whereas subjects performed
220 trails in the DE (10 trials per row in table 3.2.1), subjects performed
only 110 trials for the CE (10 trails per row in table 3.2). However, as
the designs were in both cases pseudorandomly interleaved, there is lit-
tle reason to suspect fatigue, or other duration related factors, could have
systematically biased the results in one experiment but not the other.
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Contrast of A (%) Contrast of B (%) Contrast weighting
0 100 0
10 90 0.1
20 80 0.2
30 70 0.3
40 60 0.4
50 50 0.5
60 40 0.6
70 30 0.7
80 20 0.8
90 10 0.9
100 0 1
Table 3.2: A tabulation of the parameter values for each condition in the static
experiment. The contrast weighting in the last column is defined with respect to
A. There are 11 rows corresponding to 11 different weightings between two faces,
using increments of 0.1 and constrained to sum to 1. Again conditions in which
the weighting is 0 or 1 correspond to a single face, B or A respectively.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Summations, averaging and leveraging of the sym-
metry of the experimental condition
For the analyses contained in this section data was pooled across all 20
subjects, who individually displayed systematic, but extremely noisy, vari-
ations between the DE and CE experimental conditions. As described in
detail in Methods (section 3.2) the geometry of the experimental design
is inherently symmetric, with duty cycles of 0%, 10%, 20%, 30% and 40%
being equivalent to duty cycles of 100%, 90%, 80%, 70% and 60% respec-
tively. By dint of this inherent symmetry the task of estimating judgments
was reduced to 6 point estimates, versus 11 naively. This manipulation
essentially magnifies the quality of data available for each point estimate
by a factor of 1.83 (on average) and explains the symmetry displayed the
figures, very evident for example in figure 3.8.
For many of the statistical tests performed in this chapter it will be
stated that a Bonferroni correction has been applied, with a correction fac-
tor of 1/6. Of course, this numerical value results from the fact that there
are typically 6 independent conditions and 6 statistical tests performed,
t-tests for example. This again is a consequence of the inherent symmetry
of the experimental design.
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3.3.2 Dynamic Experiment (DE) Results
In chapter 2 an exponentially smoothed state space model was developed,
and a prediction of linear interpolation for rapidly alternated stimuli was
extracted. As will be seen, experimental results do not bear this prediction
out, neither in the radial (rˆ) nor the tangential (rˆ⊥) axes. The basic numer-
ical results are shown in table 3.3 in the form of % deviation 1 from the
null hypothesis of linearity. Inspection of the table reveals that in almost
every condition the deviation is statistically significant, in both the radial
and tangential directions. Evidently, the supposition of linear interpola-
tion along the morph line as a function of duty cycle is not supported by
this data, at least not directly. A natural question following from this is
whether there is a systematic pattern of deviation to be discerned.
1100% = the norm of the vector of the midpoint of the morph line. See caption of table
3.3 for further detail.
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% Duty cycle of A % Radial deviation (s.e.) % Tangential deviation (s.e.)
0 +8.5 (±2.0)*** -5.2 (±1.7)***
10 +5.5 (±2.3)** +6.7 (±2.0)***
20 -1.7 (±2.3) +10.5 (±2.5)***
30 -10.6 (±2.3)*** +11.47 (±3.0)***
40 -9.2 (±2.4)*** +4.2 (±3.4)***
50 -14.8 (±2.3)*** +1.7 (±3.5)
60 -9.2 (±2.4)*** -0.8 (±3.4)***
70 -10.6 (±2.3)*** -8.0 (±3.0)***
80 -1.7 (±2.3) -7.0 (±2.5)***
90 +5.5 (±2.5)** -3.2 (±2.0)***
100 +8.5 (±2.0)*** +8.6 (±1.7)***
Table 3.3: Radial and tangential deviations from the predictions made by the
state space model (i.e. essentially linear interpolation according to duty cycle).
The unit of distance used to express the deviations is the norm of the vector of the
midpoint of the morphline (i.e. the distance from the origin to the midpoint of
the morphline). Brackets contain standard errors for the estimates. ∗ ∗ ∗ denotes
significance at p < 0.001. ∗ ∗ denotes significance at 0.001 < p < 0.01. ∗ denotes
significance at 0.01 < p < 0.05. The absence of an asterisk implies insufficient
evidence against the null hypothesis. All p-values are adjusted for multiple com-
parisons using the Bonferroni correction (number of independent comparisons =
6). Column 2 (radial deviation) confirms what can be appreciated visually from,
for example, figures 3.4 and 3.5, namely a positive bias for conditions in which
the duty cycle is close to 0% or 100%, which reverses to a pronounced negative
bias as the duty cycle approaches 50%. Column 3 demonstrates was is less obvi-
ous, but still appreciable from the figures, namely that there is an apparent bias
towards the extremities of the morphline. This could be thought of as a repulsive
effect away from the midpoint of the morphline or conversely an attractive effect
towards the extremes.
91
An appreciation of the divergence from linearity is aided by visualis-
ing the data. When we do so, as in figure 3.4, it is apparent that for in-
termediate duty cycles there is a very significant deviation of judgements
away from the morph line and towards the norm. This is most pronounced
when the duty cycle is 50%, that is when the two faces are present for the
same length of time on any one cycle of period 100ms or 200ms. As can
be seen from figures 3.5 and 3.10 this effect is pronounced for periods of
both 100ms and 200ms. In contrast, the state space model, developed in
chapter 2, predicts that the subject’s percept should interpolate along the
morph line on average, and therefore we would expect the judgements to
do so too. These deviations from the morph line are highly statistically
significant in nearly every duty cycle, as shown in figure 3.8.
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Furthermore, not only did the means of the response distributions dif-
fer considerably from those predicted by the state space model, but the
variability of responses also changed as a function of the duty cycle. The
state space model in fact makes no explicit prediction about the form of the
response distributions, and it was assumed that they would essentially
be well approximated by isotropic Gaussians. That this is not the case
can be seen from figure 3.9 which shows the response distributions plot-
ted for each of 11 proportional durations 0, 0.1, . . . , 1.0. There is a marked
trend from narrow (low entropy) anisotropic distributions at extremes of
the duty cycle (i.e. ≈ 0% or 100%) to broad (high entropy) more isotropic
distributions at intermediate duty cycles (i.e. ≈ 50%).
Although a prominent bowing effect can be seen in both the 100ms and
200ms conditions of the DE a natural question is whether the judgement
lines in these two conditions are statistically indistinguishable. That there
is indeed no significant difference between the subjects’ judgments in the
two conditions is demonstrated in subsection 3.3.3.
The question arises as to whether some or all of this deviation form
the morphline can be explained by the design of the experiment. Firstly,
as noted previously, the initialisation point on each trial was chosen ran-
domly and uniformly from the 9-by-21 2D grid of faces. Thus the deviation
towards the norm cannot be explained by, say, always starting at the norm,
moving randomly and stopping after a short time (so that there would be
little opportunity to ”diffuse” away from the origin). What about edge ef-
fects? Since subjects could only move freely up, down, left or right when
not at the edge of the 2D face grid perhaps this somehow distorts even a
96
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Figure 3.8: Radial deviation from prediction of linear interpolation. Data shown
for all 20 subjects in the DE. Two sided t-test were performed wherein the null hy-
pothesis states that the judgements are sampled from a distribution with a mean
that lies on the morph line. ∗ ∗ ∗ denotes significance at p < 0.001. ∗ ∗ denotes
significance at 0.001 < p < 0.01. ∗ denotes significance at 0.01 < p < 0.05. The ab-
sence of an asterisk implies insufficient evidence against the null hypothesis. All
p-values are adjusted for multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni correction
(number of independent comparisons = 6). See section 3.4 for further discussion
random walk with random initialisation and stopping point irrespective
of what target stimulus is present. In other words, what is the null distri-
bution assuming that the target face has no effect upon stopping position
for the matcher? This null hypothesis can be expressed, for the 2D slice,
as a Markov chain with 189 states, or nodes corresponding to the faces
within the 2D grid, and an bidirectional edges between two states/nodes
if the two faces are adjacent on the grid. To express this graphically would
require a graph with 189 nodes and a corresponding transition matrix of
dimensions 189 x 189. We can however illustrate the situation for a some-
what smaller 3 x 4 grid, which is nevertheless possesses the same prop-
erties as the 9 x 21 grid in terms of analysis. A Markov chain for the
analogous 3 x 4 case is shown in figure 3.11 and the corresponding (time-
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Figure 3.11: A 3 by 4 markov model, analogous to the 9 by 21 plane of faces
subjects navigate around with the matcher.
homogeneous) transition matrix, P , in equation 3.4.
The stationary distribution for a positive recurrent, time-homogenous
Markov chain of n vertices is given by solving the equation
pi = piP (3.1)
Given the constraint that
n∑
i=1
pii = 1 (3.2)
Leaving the details of the algebra to one side, for the sake of brevity, it
turns out that any such Markov chain we care to construct will in general
have a stationary distribution, pi such that
pii = 1/n (3.3)
The material point we extract from this analysis is thus that a subject
moving randomly in the 2D plane, despite the apparent possibility of edge
101
effect, will nevertheless achieve a uniform distribution across the grid.
And the upshot is that the non-uniformity seen in the subject data can-
not therefore plausibly be an artefact of the experimental design, at least
as regards the possibility of edge effects on a random walk.
P =

0.5 0.25 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.25 0.5 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0
0.25 0 0 0 0.25 0.25 0 0 0.25 0 0 0
0 0.25 0 0 0.25 0 0.25 0 0 0.25 0 0
0 0 0.25 0 0 0.25 0 0.25 0 0 0.25 0
0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0.25 0.25 0 0 0 0.25
0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0.5 0.25 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0.25 0.25 0.25
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0.25 0.5

(3.4)
3.3.3 A comparison of the 100ms condition and the 200ms
condition for the Dynamic Experiment
As can be seen from the data in both the 100ms and 200ms condition, there
is a pronounced bowing in both conditions. However, an important ques-
tion is whether the pattern of radial and lateral deviation from the predic-
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tions of linearity are identical in the two cases. If it is really the case that,
below a certain threshold duration at which one perceives a single face dis-
tinctly, it is the relative duration of one stimulus with respect to the other
that chiefly explains the location of subjects judgements, then the absolute
duration of each stimulus should not matter. To be explicit, we should see
no difference between the 100ms and 200ms conditions if this account is at
least approximately true. Moreover, were there a significant difference be-
tween the judgements obtained in the 100ms and 200ms conditions, then
this could invalidate the pooled analysis of the bowing effect presented.
Figure 3.12 confirms visually that the judgements from the 100ms and
200ms conditions are indeed extremely similar. This visual impression is
confirmed statistically in that two sampled t-tests performed across con-
ditions shown no significant difference, even at the lowest conventional
threshold for signioficance (i.e. p < 0.05). The results of these tests are
shown in table 3.4
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Figure 3.12: Overlaying the judgement curves made from subject data in the
100ms (red) and 200ms (blue) conditions shows there is little difference between
the two, neither in lateral nor the radial directions. This is confirmed by two sam-
ple t-tests across all duty cycles with Bonferroni corrections, the results of which
are shown in table 3.4. Error bars represent standard errors.
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Duty cycle of A (%) H0(|r⊥|) p H0(|r|) p
0 0 0.87401 0 0.92497
10 0 0.9932 0 0.48461
20 0 0.075039 0 0.88938
30 0 0.012027 0 0.42858
40 0 0.034563 0 0.90583
50 0 1 0 0.21612
60 0 0.034563 0 0.90583
70 0 0.012027 0 0.42858
80 0 0.075039 0 0.88938
90 0 0.9932 0 0.48461
100 0 0.87401 0 0.92497
Table 3.4: Results of two sample t-tests carried out on subjects’ jusdgements for
the 100ms and 200ms DE. The columns headed by H0, i.e. columns 2 and 4,
denote the result of the hypothesis test for the lateral (|r⊥|) and radial (|r|) di-
rections respectively, with 0 indicating insufficient evidence to reject the null hy-
pothesis that the data are drawn from the same distribution in both the 100ms
and 200ms conditions. p denotes the p-value of each test. The level of signifi-
cance was p < 0.05, with a Bonferroni correction for (6) multiple comparisons
(i.e. p < 0.05/6 = 0.0083).
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3.3.4 Contrast Experiment (CE) Results
The main motivation for performing the CE (Contrast Experiment) was a
concern that the bowing effect found in the DE might be an artefact of the
experimental design or somehow unrelated to the dynamic features of the
stimuli. In this sense the CE is really a control experiment and the results,
shown in figure 3.13 bear out the contention that the bowing effect seen
in the DE is indeed a consequence of the dynamic nature of the stimuli,
since in this static context it is entirely absent, and indeed the data exhibit
a small bias in the opposite direction. Figure 3.15 displays the results of
a t-test performed for each contrast weighting with the null hypothesis
being that the judgements are sampled from a distribution with a mean
on the morph line. The null hypothesis is rejected for all but one of the
conditions. In short there appears to be a fairly consistent centrifugal ra-
dial deviation from the morph line, akin to that seen in the DE for more
extreme duty cycles (see table 3.3). Given that this effect is not significant
for all conditions an important question is whether there is any systematic
change as a function of contrast weighting, analogous to the centrifugal to
centripetal trend seen in the DE as duty cycles varied from 0% or 100% to
50%. Table 3.6 shows the results of a paired t-test between the extreme con-
ditions (contrast weightings of 0% or 100%) and intermediate conditions.
As can be seen from the second column, every comparison is insignificant
at a significance level of 0.05, supporting the hypothesis that there is no
systematic change as a function of contrast weighting, and in particular
no bowing of the kind seen in the DE. In summary then, the data from the
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CE and DE experiments appear to deviate from the predictions of linear-
ity in the same way, with the singular exception of the radial centripetal
effect, the bowing, which is only seen in the DE.
The bowing effect, present in the DE and absent in the CE (see table
3.6), relates to the deviation from linear interpolation in the radial direc-
tion, and is as discussed prominent in the data. However, there are equally
significant deviations in the tangential or lateral direction. These devia-
tions are tabulated in figure 3.5 and displayed graphically in figure 3.16.
Contrast of A (%) Deviation in |r| (%) (s.e.) Deviation in |r⊥| (%) (s.e.)
0 +8.5 (±2.8)*** -6.5 (±2.5)***
10 +7.5 (±2.8)** +11.4 (±2.3)***
20 +8.9 (±2.8)*** +23.5 (±2.4)***
30 +10.6 (±2.9)*** +36.1 (±3.0)***
40 +3.1 (±3.2) +29.6 (±3.6)***
50 +10.6 (±3.0)** +0.3 (±4.6)
60 +3.1 (±3.2) -29.1 (±3.6)***
70 +10.6 (±2.9)*** -35.6 (±3.0)***
80 +8.9 (±2.8)*** -22.9 (±2.4)***
90 +7.5 (±2.8)** -10.8 (±2.3)***
100 +8.5 (±2.8)*** +7.1 (±2.5)***
Table 3.5: Radial (|r|) and tangential (|r⊥|) deviations from the predictions made
from a ”contrast model” (i.e. linear interpolation along the morphline accord-
ing to the % contrast). The unit of distance used to express the deviations is the
norm of the vector of the midpoint of the morphline (i.e. the distance from the
origin to the midpoint of the morphline). Brackets contain standard errors for
the estimates. ∗ ∗ ∗ denotes significance at p < 0.001. ∗ ∗ denotes significance
at 0.001 < p < 0.01. ∗ denotes significance at 0.01 < p < 0.05. The absence of
an asterisk implies insufficient evidence against the null hypothesis. All p-value
thresholds are adjusted for multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni correction
(number of independent comparisons = 6).
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Contrast of A (%) H0 p
0 vs. 0 0 1
0 vs.10 0 0.7358
0 vs. 20 0 0.8738
0 vs.30 0 0.4554
0 vs.40 0 0.0767
0 vs.50 0 0.6636
0 vs.60 0 0.0767
0 vs.70 0 0.4554
0 vs.80 0 0.8738
0 vs.90 0 0.7358
0 vs.100 0 1
Table 3.6: Results of two sample t-tests carried out on subjects’ judgements to
test for evidence of bowing (or other changes in radial deviation) in the CE. The
column headed H0, i.e. column 2, denotes the result of the hypothesis test, with
0 indicating insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no difference in
radial deviation compared to the extreme conditions (i.e. 0% and 100%). The
level of significance was p < 0.05, with a Bonferroni correction for (6) multiple
comparisons (i.e. p < 0.05/6 = 0.0083). Note that a comparison between 0%
and 0%, and 0% and 100% is included for clarity of exposition, but returns a p-
value of 1, and therefore a -ve result at all levels of significance, by definition. The
implication of this is that there is no evidence of systematic variation as a function
of contrast weighting, and in particular of bowing.
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3.4 Discussion
The upshot of the experimental results presented in this chapter can be
summarised in the following way: when two faces are rapidly alternated,
the percept is not a linear interpolation of the two stimuli. Instead, there
appears to be a radial centripetal deviation towards the origin of face space
at intermediate duty cycles (30-70 %) and a radial centrifugal deviation at
duty cycles close to 0% or 100% (0-10% and 90-100%). In terms of the lat-
eral or tangential deviation there are also deviations from the predictions
of linear interpolation, namely a tangential centrifugal bias at duty cycles
of 10-90% and a tangential centripetal bias at duty cycles of 0% and 100%.
Moreover, the results of the CE reproduce the pattern of radial centrifugal
and tangential deviations seen in the DE, but do not reproduce the radial
centripetal effect, suggesting that the radial centripetal effect is not a gen-
eral feature of merging two stimuli, but somehow arises from the rapid
alternation of stimuli particular to the DE. This is shown in figures 3.15
and table 3.6.
However, because the CE was designed and performed after the DE,
and specifically in light of the curious bowing effect evident in the results
of the DE, one cannot exclude the possibility that these differences were
due to adaptive effects. For example, one possibility might be that sub-
jects were initially (i.e. during the DE) unfamiliar with the stimuli, and
therefore biased towards the norm face (i.e. the origin). However, as they
became more familiar with the stimuli (i.e. during the CE) they may have
adjusted their estimates to the locations of the actual stimuli (i.e. the ex-
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tremes of the morph line). This might therefore explain how the prominent
centrifugal radial effect, seen in the DE, was apparently abolished in the
CE, without having anything to do in fact with the design of the experi-
ments.
In addition to the radial deviations from linearity, a prominent feature
of the data concerns the lateral, or tangential, deviations, displayed nu-
merically in tables 3.3 and 3.5 and graphically in figures 3.6 and 3.16. A
comparison of the lateral deviations in the CE and DE reveals that the
pattern of lateral deviation is replicated across experimental conditions,
however the magnitudes of the deviations are considerably greater in the
CE than in the DE. Indeed, comparison of tangential deviations in tables
3.6 (DE) and 3.16 (CE) reveals that the magnitude of the lateral deviation
for duty cycles or contrasts other than 0%, 50% and 100% was greater in
the (CE) by a factor of around 2 (10%) to 30 (60%). However, the fact that
the CE was performed in every case after the DE again makes it impossi-
ble to establish conclusively whether this is a difference due to the design
of the experiment or an adaptive effect dependent on familiarity with the
stimuli.
Were experiments to be repeated, one could examine the possibility
of temporal or adaptive effects by having half the subjects perform the
CE and then the DE and the other half perform the DE and then the CE.
Still better this possibility of subjects becoming familiarised with specific
stimuli could have been prevented completely by using a sufficiently large
number stimuli such that the subject never saw the same stimuli in more
than one trial. In actual fact, as small set of only ten pairs of faces was
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used, meaning that this scenario is rendered quite possible. It would be an
important aspect of future work to eliminate this possible explanation of
the data.
A prominent feature of the data in both the CE and the DE, in addition
to the radial centripetal and lateral deviations already discussed, is a ra-
dial centrifugal deviation. This is seen at duty cycles of 0%, 10%, 90%, and
100% in the DE and at contrast weightings of all except 40% and 60% in
the CE. Even in the case of the 40% and 60% contrast weightings, while
the effect does not reach statistical significance, the effect is in the direc-
tion of a radial centrifugal deviation as can be seen from figure 3.13. A
natural thought is that this represents a rediscovery of the controversial
caricature effect. Indeed, the experimental design, with the matching and
target stimuli side by side, is such that the subject is not in fact matching
two stimuli directly, but matching one stimulus to a mental representation
of the other stimulus. This would accord with accounts of the caricature
effect whereby a caricature is recognised ”better” (e.g. faster and/or with
more confidence) than a veridical image [Lee et al., 2000].
Notwithstanding the preceding caveats it is interesting to consider a
probabilistic account of the most curious feature of the data in the DE,
conspicuously absent in the CE, namely the strong radial centripetal de-
viation at intermediate duty cycles. In the following chapter I will de-
velop a model showing how such as ”bowing” of the judgements could
arise as a consequence of a Bayesian inferential process underpinning face-
perception. The motivating intuition is that a rapidly alternating stimulus
is inherently variable and therefore possessed of a degree of uncertainty
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much greater that a static stimulus. If we consider an analogy with a
Bernoulli random variable, X ∼ Bern (p), (such as describes a coin which
may or may not be biased), the variance and therefore uncertainly about
the outcome is greatest when the parameter p is equal to 0.5. In accordance
with canonical Bayesian theory, as evidence (represented by the likelihood
function) becomes increasingly weak the posterior distribution approxi-
mates more and more closely to the prior distribution. In the context of
our experimental results weak evidence in the form of an alternating stim-
ulus, in the presence of a strong, central isotropic Gaussian prior, translates
into an estimate of the location of the stimulus in face space closer to the
norm or origin of face space.
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4
A Bayesian Account of a Novel
Dynamic Effect in Face Space
This chapter develops a model of probabilistic inference in face space.
The basic assumption is that probability distributions are somehow
represented in the brain. A Bayesian model is presented in which
a prior over face space is combined with data (through a likelihood
function) in the process of performing inference. Once the parame-
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ters of this model have been fitted, using Markov Chain Monte Carlo,
this result in a ”bowing” effect that is apparently very similar to the
data presented from the DE in chapter 3. This arises as a direct con-
sequence of the Bayesian nature of the model. The chapter concludes
with a discussion of some recent work in entomology that is sug-
gestive of a possible class of neural mechanisms underpinning this
effect.
4.1 Probabilistic Perceptual Inference
As discussed at length in chapter 1 section 1.4 there is now a broad and
firm literature supporting the notion that humans can, and typically do,
use prior knowledge of the statistical structure of the world to perform
perceptual inference and guide behaviour [Ko¨rding and Wolpert, 2004].
Given a prior distribution over some variate of interest and an appropri-
ate likelihood function the proper way to combine these sources of infor-
mation to obtain a posterior distribution is given by Bayes’ rule [Bishop,
2006].
P (θ|I) ∝ P (I|θ)P (θ) (4.1)
It is very likely that the brain implements computations approximat-
ing Bayesian inference for a broad range of low level inference problems,
as discussed at length in section 1.4 of chapter 1. These include, for exam-
ple, estimating the orientation of line segments in the visual field [Girshick
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et al., 2011]. However, it is less obvious that the brain adopts a Bayesian
approach to high level problems such as facial identity. This chapter de-
scribes how a Bayesian framework can account for some of the curious
features of the experimental findings described in chapter 3.
It should be made quite clear at the outset that this model is in no way
intended to represent a mechanistic account of inference within face per-
ception. On the contrary its purpose if purely to demonstrate that some of
the idiosyncrasies of the data, and in particular the prominent ”bowing”
effect seen in the DE (Dynamic Experiment) presented in subsection 3.3.2
can be explained by supposing a Bayesian computation at the heart of the
process. It is therefore simply hypothesised this inferential process under-
pins the visual perceptual machinery relating to face perception, without
making further claims concerning its nature.
4.2 Considerations Regarding Modelling Dimen-
sionality
If something like face space does approximate the biological representa-
tion present in healthy humans, then it seems the representation is likely
to be extremely high dimensional, even considering only the perspective
of shape and texture. Indeed, the full Basel Face Model (BFM), which
appears to provide a reasonable, albeit imperfect, predictor for similarity
judgements in human subjects, comprises a 398 dimensional feature space
(199 dimension in the texture model, and another 199 dimensions in the
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shape model). Consider for a moment a multivariate normal distribution
over this space, already a fairly restrictive assumption. Such a distribu-
tion, in its most general form, requires a forbidding 79,401 parameters to
be specified 1. Following Valentine and others [Valentine, 1991b] I suppose
that the prior in face space is a isotropic multivariate normal distribution
with a 0-vector mean. This, in contrast, requires a single parameter, es-
sentially specifying the rate at which the density falls off with eccentricity.
Alternatively one could consider only a d-dimensional subspace of the full
feature space, in which case one need only specify d+d(d−1)/2 parameters
in the general case. As described in the methods section (3.2) of chapter
3, subjects were required to match the target stimulus with a face selected
from a 2D grid within a high dimensional face space. Because judgements
in any trial were constrained to a 2D plane we can therefore conduct the
modelling in a 2D space, making fitting the parameters of the model to
data tractable.
4.3 A Probabilistic Model of Face Perception
The basic motivation behind the Bayesian model outlined in this chapter
is the desire to account for some curious features of the results presented
in chapter 3. In that chapter we saw that where the stimulus was dynamic
there emerged an unusual bias in the responses of subjects, which can be
describe as a bowing towards the origin in the judgements of subjects. A
salient feature of this bowing appears to be that the degree of deviation
1398 to specify the mean vector, and a further 79,003 to specify the covariance matrix
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from the morph line is approximately monotonically related to the degree
of variability in the stimulus, reaching a maximum where the duty cycle
is 50%. This is depicted in figure 4.1 and is given formally by the equation
4.2, where Xd represents the position on the morph line for a given duty
cycle, d (0 ≤ d ≤ 1), and M denotes the total length of the morph line. Of
note is the formal similarity to the variance of a Bernoulli random variable,
p(1− p), i.e. equal up to a constant factor M2/100, also illustrated in figure
4.1
Var[Xd] =
M2
100
d(1− d) (4.2)
The model proposed in this chapter is a relatively simple one based on
some elementary facts about the nervous system, such as that its compu-
tations are subject to intrinsic neuronal as well as perceptual noise, which
tends to reduce the certainty with which an organism can estimate the
value of a variable. Furthermore, as a relatively high level attempt to un-
derstand the brain as a Bayesian computational device there is little to say
about the implementation of this model at a neuronal level, although in
section 4.7 an interesting possibility from the insect swarm intelligence lit-
erature is discussed [Seeley et al., 2012]. In Marr’s terms this account oper-
ates at the representational/algorithmic level [Marr, 1983]. The graphical
representation for this declarative model of perception is depicted in fig-
ure 4.2, which illustrates the dependency structure of the model [Bishop,
2006].
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Figure 4.1: Upper panel: the variance of the stimulus varies as a function of the
duty cycle of A, reaching a maximum where the duty cycle is 50%. Lower panel:
the variance of a Bernoulli random variable as a function of p. As can be appreci-
ated from the curves in the upper and lower panels, they differ only by a constant
M2/100, where M is the total length of the morph line.
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pn pip po
pr
st
rv
st ∼ N (µst,Σst) (stimulus)
pn ∼ N (µpn = 0,Σpn) (perceptual noise )
pip ∼ N (µpip,Σpip) (perceptual input)
pr ∼ N (µpr,Σpr) (prior distribution in facespace)
po ∼ N (µpo,Σpo) (posterior distribution)
rv ∼ N (µrv,Σrv) (response distribution/variability)
Figure 4.2: A graphical model of perceptual inference in face space and specifica-
tion of the nodes. Shading denotes an ”observed” node, in this case the stimulus
(st) and the response (rv) of the subject. The remaining unobserved, or latent,
nodes represent the random variables representing perceptual noise (pn), per-
ceptual input (pip), the prior distribution over face space (pip), and the posterior
distribution over face space (po). See figure 4.4 for a list and description of the
free parameters within the model. A property of any random variable is that it is
associated with a probability distribution. See sections 4.4 and 4.5 for details of
how these distributions are parameterised.
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4.4 Parameter Descriptions and Interpretations
There follows an enumeration and description of the seven parameters
with the Bayesian model of perception which are fitted using MCMC sam-
pling. See figure 4.2 for a description of the dependency structure of the
model in the form of a graphical model of the perceptual process. In
section 4.5 these parameters are related mathematically to the graphical
model depicted in figure 4.2.
p1: perceptual noise factor (a nonnegative real value). Determines the
magnitude of intrinsic perceptual, and presumably chiefly neuronal, noise.
Relates to the random variable ’pn’ in figure 4.2.
p2: prior distribution in face space factor (a nonnegative real value).
Determines the width or ”strength” of the isotropic Gaussian prior in face
space. Relates to the random variable ’pr’ in figure 4.2.
p3: window of integration (a positive integer). Given some Gaussian
distribution for the prior and for the perceptual input this parameter actu-
ally determines the number of samples that are taken from the perceptual
input distribution, pip ∼ N (µpip,Σpip), in computing the posterior distri-
bution over face space, and thereby represents a discretised window of
time, sometimes also referred to as a window of integration. Relates to the
random variables ’po’, ’pr’ and ’pip’ in figure 4.2.
p4: isotropic stimulus variance weight (a nonnegative real value be-
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tween 0 and 1). This parameter defines a continuum between the model
in which the brain is able to appreciate that the variance in the stimu-
lus occurs within a single axis and the model in which the brain assumes
that total variance in the stimulus is attributable to all axes equally and is
therefore, so to speak, shared equally among them. Relates to the random
variable ’st’ in figure 4.2.
p5: perceptual noise form ratio (a nonnegative real value). This param-
eter determines the form of the perceptual noise, and represents the ratio
of the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix. The effect is to allow the per-
ceptual noise to adopt either an isotropic (p5 = 1) or an anisotropic form
(0 ≤ p5 < 1). Relates to the random variable ’pn’ in figure 4.2. The basis
of this feature of the model is the observation that at a duty cycle of 0% or
100% the subject is matching a static, unchanging stimulus and yet the dis-
tribution of judgements suggests that there is an increased variance along
the radial axis as compared to the tangential vector (i.e. a fitted Gaussian
forms a cigar shape orientated towards the origin appreciable in figure
3.9). This phenomenon, a relative insensitivity to radial versus tangential
change, has been previously observed [Ross et al., 2010].
p6: response bias magnitude (a nonnegative real value). This parameter
represents a multiplicative bias in the distribution of judgements, which is
evident both in the dynamic (figures 3.5 and 3.10) and the contrast (figure
3.13)experiments. Relates to the random variables ’po’ and ’rv’ in figure
4.2.
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p7: response variance factor (a nonnegative real value). This parame-
ter scales the covariance matrix of the response distribution. It is based
on the idea that there exists within the brain a posterior distribution on
which the motor response is based. This could result in a response dis-
tribution with either a greater or a lesser total variance than the posterior
itself. For example, if the posterior were inefficiently utilised then the dis-
tribution might be very broad, whereas if it were computed several times,
i.e. repeatedly sampled, then it might result in a response distribution
somewhat narrower than the posterior (i.e. with a lower total variance).
4.5 Model Definitions and Specifications
It will now be made explicit how exactly the relevant quantities (the pa-
rameters of the distributions) for the model are computed. Regarding the
stimulus, as described in chapter 3, this is on any given trial in the dynamic
experiment a deterministic stimulus with a fixed and regular duty cycle.
All the same we can compute the mean and variance for any condition
and treat it henceforth as if it were a truly random variable.
µst = [x¯, y¯]
> =
1
T
T∑
t=1
ft (4.3)
Where the x and y variables correspond to the radial and tangential co-
ordinates used to determine a position on the 2D-slice through face space
described in chapter 3. T represents the number of milliseconds in a duty
cycle, either 100 or 200. Similarly, the covariance matrix of the stimulus,
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Σst, is determined by the following expressions
Var[x] =
∑T
i=1(xi − x¯)2
T
(4.4)
Var[y] =
∑T
i=1(yi − y¯)2
T
(4.5)
Cov[x, y] =
∑T
i=1(xi − x¯)(yi − y¯)
T
(4.6)
Explicitly then, the covariance matrix is constructed as follows
Σst =
 Var[x] Cov[x, y]
Cov[x, y] Var[y]
 (4.7)
Moving on to the random variable ’pn’ we suppose that perceptual
noise is unbiased in terms of its mean, so
µpn = 0 (4.8)
However, we incorporate into the model the possibility that the form
of the noise may be anisotropic, with the long axis of the ellipse parallel or
orthogonal to the radial axis. In other words, we suppose that the percep-
tual noise may be such that the level of variability towards and away from
the origin or norm in face space need not be equal to the variability tan-
gential to a sphere in face space. In chapter 5 subsection 5.2.3 I will present
evidence, from a separate experiment, that noise in the radial direction is
indeed significantly greater than in the tangential direction, a finding that
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is consonant with previous research [Ross et al., 2010]. To return to the
immediate subject however, three parameters are required: one to control
the ratio of the eigenvectors of the anisotropic covariance matrix, i.e. the
form of the perceptual noise, one to control the overall spread (entropy) of
the distribution and one to control the balance between an isotropic and
an anisotropic estimate of the form of the noise in the stimulus. The ma-
terial question motivating this aspect of the model is whether the brain is
able to appreciate that the variance in the stimulus occurs in a single axis,
tangential to a (hyper-) sphere in face space, and use this information in
producing its estimate of stimulus location in face space? Or, is the brain
only able to appreciate the overall variance in the stimulus, tr(Σst), ap-
portioning it isotropically, as it were, to all axes equally. In mathematical
terms the stimulus variance contribute to the perceptual input according
to equation 4.9 or 4.10.
Σpipiso = tr(Σst)
 1 0
0 0
+ p1Σpn (4.9)
Σpipaniso =
1
2
tr(Σst)
 1 0
0 1
+ p1Σpn (4.10)
Rather than deciding this arbitrarily opting for one model or another
we can parameterise a continuum between the two as per equation 4.11.
Σpip = p4Σpipiso + (1− p4)Σpipaniso) (4.11)
The prior over face space is assumed to be an isotropic Gaussian, fol-
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lowing Valentine and others [Valentine et al., 2016] and is a consequence of
the assumption of isotropy underlying the whole experimental setup. In
chapter 5 this assumption is tested directly and found to be false, strictly
speaking. However the anisotropy is not severe enough to completely un-
dermine the merit of our approach, since clearly consistent judgements
are made despite the error of this assumption. Finally a single parameter
serves to parameterise the ”strength” of the Gaussian prior in face space,
which is an isotropic Gaussian.
Σpr = p4 · I (4.12)
With the prior and the perceptual input distributions defined we are
now in a position to combine these so as to obtain the posterior distribu-
tion, through the process known as Bayesian inference. Accordingly [Mur-
phy, 2012] the mean of the posterior is give by
µpo =
(
Σ−1pr + p3Σ
−1
pip
)−1 (
Σ−1pr µpr + p3Σ
−1
pipµpip
)
(4.13)
And the posterior covariance is given by
Σpo =
(
Σ−1pr + p3Σ
−1
pip
)−1 (4.14)
Naturally, one supposes that this posterior distribution is the repre-
sentation used by the nervous system to orchestrate a motor response,
manipulating the matcher to resemble the dynamic stimulus in this case.
However while the distribution of responses should utilise this represen-
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tation it does not follow that it need be the same, and this seems to be for
at least two reasons. Firstly, for reasons which are not completely clear,
there appears to be a small but consistent bias in subjects’ judgements,
such that they consistently place the matcher at a position in face space
slightly more centripetal than the target. This is evident in both the DE
and CE (Dynamic Experiment and Contrast Experiment, see chapter 3).
Despite the apparent oddness of this feature of the data it is nevertheless
a prominent and statistically significant one, and the model therefore in-
corporates a ”response bias” parameter, p6. Thus the mean of the response
distribution within the model is given by
µrv = p5µpo (4.15)
Furthermore we suppose that the total variance of the response distri-
bution could either be greater than, less than or indeed equal to, that of the
posterior. This could be due to corruption by noise within the motor sys-
tem, inattention on the part of the subject, which would tend to increase
the total variance. Alternatively a resampling process whereby the poste-
rior was computed repeatedly could result in a response distribution with
a lower total variance than the posterior distribution. In any case as we
are not in a position to adopt anything but an agnostic position on this
question currently so the covariance matrix for the response distribution
is parameterised so as to allow for these possibilities.
Σrv = p7Σpo (4.16)
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4.6 Model Parameter Estimation
MCMC (Markov Chain Monte Carlo) [Andrieu et al., 2003] was used to
fit the parameters of the model to the data, assuming uniform distribu-
tions over the allowable range of the parameters. Of the many flavours
of MCMC that could be adopted I opted for an approach based on the
Metropolis algorithm [Bolstad, 2010], mainly for reasons of simplicity and
transparency in implementation and presentation. This approach allows
one to samples from a probability distribution P (x) in the absence of an
explicit representation, so long as one can evaluate a function f(x) which
is proportional to it. In this case P (x) is the joint distribution with support
over 7 dimensional parameter space. Here x therefore corresponds to a
1 by 7 vector. The function f(x) was defined as the squared symmetric
KL-divergence between the empirical response distributions seen in ex-
periments and the predicted response distributions from the perceptual
graphical model depicted in figure 4.2. Thus, any choice of values for the
parameter vector, x, implies a set of 11 predicted response distributions
(one for each duty cycle percentage { 0%, 10%, . . . , 100% }), which we
denote Rm as opposed to the set of 11 response distributions established
empirically Re. 2 So,
Rm = {Nm1,Nm2, . . . ,Nm11} (4.17)
2Due to the inherent symmetry of the experimental condition (e.g. duty cycle percent-
ages of 10% and 90% are equivalent) this in fact reduces to 6.
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and,
Re = {Ne1,Ne2, . . . ,Ne11} (4.18)
From this we define the fucntion f(x) to be the the squared sum of the
symmetric KL-divergence between the empirically derived distrbutions,Re,
and the model derived distributions Rm for some x. i.e.
f(x) =
11∑
i=1
(DKL(Nmi||Nei) +DKL(Nei||Nmi))2 (4.19)
Fortunately the KL-divergence can be computed efficiently for two mul-
tivariate normal distributions, say Na = N (µa,Σa) and Nb = N (µb,Σb),
and, where k is the dimensionality of the distributions, is as follows
DKL(Na‖Nb) = 1
2
(
tr
(
Σ−1b Σa
)
+ (µb − µa)>Σ−1b (µb − µa)− k + ln
(
det Σb
det Σa
))
.
(4.20)
Using the KL-divergence in this way to estimate the target distribution
represented a significant computational benefit and can be evaluated in
constant time with respect to the size of the dataset, n, and therefore lin-
ear in the number of MCMC iterations, m, i.e. O(m). In contrast using
the likelihood of the data requires evaluating each datum under a mul-
tivariate normal and is therefore linear in the size of the data, n, and in
the number of MCMC iterations, m, i.e. O(mn). The practical implication
for MCMC was that using the likelihood was approximately an order of
magnitude slower and produce comparable results in terms of the quality
of the MCMC. This accounts for why a somewhat atypical function (the
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sqaured KL-divergence) was used to estimate the target distribution over
the parameters of the model.
4.6.1 MCMC for Parameter Estimation
This section details the particular incarnation of the MCMC used for fit-
ting the model to the data. Where a random vector was sampled from
parameter space each element was sampled independently from a uni-
form distribution over a fixed interval corresponding to a plausible range.
The suitability of the intervals chosen was confirmed by the marginal dis-
tributions obtained, which strongly suggest that the support in each case
is a subset of the parameter intervals chosen for sampling. It remains of
course possible that the support only partially intersects with the chosen
intervals, however this is a general issue with MCMC and not something
peculiar to this application [Andrieu et al., 2003].
Algorithm 1 MCMC with squared symmetric DKL
1: procedure
2: Initialisation
3: x← random vector
4: loop:
5: x′ ← x + random vector
6: α = f(x
′)
f(x)
7: u ∼ U(0, 1)
8: if α > u then x← x′
This algorithm was implemented in the Matlab 3 programming lan-
guage. The algorithm was run for 200, 000 iterations of the MCMC loop
shown in pseudocode. Of the parameter values sampled, those which re-
3R2015b
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sulted in the minimum (squared symmetric) KL-divergence between the
model’s response distributions, Rm, and those established by experiment,
Re, were used as an estimate of the true maximum. The values thereby
obtained are in themselves of limited interest, since, as I have mentioned
previously, it seems highly unlikely that the numerical value of any pa-
rameter within the model relates directly to a biological parameter of sig-
nificance. This is to be expected as the model was conceived with a proof-
of-principle objective: can a Bayesian mode of inference explain the promi-
nent bowing effect observed in the experimental data.
4.6.2 MCMC Validation
As described previously (section 4.6), the MCMC procedure allows one to
obtain an estimate of the posterior distribution over parameter space. For
my purposes I wish to obtain point estimates for my probabilistic model of
inference, which I can do by taking the (estimated) maximum of the joint
distribution over parameter space. MCMC is a widely used algorithm in
part due to its very broad applicability across multiple model types, how-
ever this is also due to the empirical finding that it often works extremely
well. The word ”works” must here be taken with a pinch of salt since al-
though MCMC does come with asymptotic guarantees this is almost never
the case in practical use setting where sampling must of necessity be finite.
As a consequence there are several standard techniques for assessing the
quality of the MCMC procedure.
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4.6.3 MCMC Results
Figures 4.8 4.9 and 4.10 illustrate the Bayesian step in the probabilistic
model of face perception presented here. For each duty cycle between
0 and 50 % the prior, likelihood and posterior are shown, figures 4.8 4.9
and 4.10 respectively. In each panel iso-probability ellipsoids 4 are shown
for the complementary functions. In each case the prior is represented by
cyan ellipsoids (actually circles since the prior is isotropic), the posterior
by black ellipsoids, and the likelihood by red ellipsoids. Several features
are of note. Firstly one can observe that the form of the likelihood (rep-
resenting the distribution of the data plus perceptual noise) varies sys-
tematically from a duty cycle of 0% to 50%, becoming broader and more
isotropic. This corresponds to the variability in the data increasing from
a minimum at a duty cycle of 0% to a maximum at 50%, as discussed in
section 4.3. In contrast, but as we would expect, the prior distribution re-
mains constant. The interaction then of the prior and likelihood is seen
in the variation of the posterior distribution across duty cycles, where we
again see a systematic change from narrow elongated distributions at 0%
to broad and increasingly isotropic distributions at 50%.
Thus, the model is successful in reproducing the so-called bowing seen
in the data, at least in the sense of reproducing a centrifugal bias at more
extreme duty cycles and a centripetal bias at intermediate duty cycles. This
is the pattern seen in the DE, though of course not in the CE, an issue
discussed in section 4.7.
4Defined as the ellipsoid which circumscribes 39% of the probability mass
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Figure 4.7: cf. figures 4.5 and 4.6. The upper and lower two panels are exact
reproductions of those in figures 4.5 and 4.6 respectively, presented again here
for ease of comparison. While there is obviously some discrepancy between the
two some basic features of the two sets of response distributions are the similar.
That is, a small centripetal bias most evident at duty cycles of 0% and 100% and an
increasing ”bowing”-effect towards the origin at increasingly intermediate duty
cycles, reaching a maximum magnitude at 50%.
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4.7 Discussion
How convincing is the preceding model for the curious results presented
in chapter 3? In particular how convincing an explanation is this for the
bowing, the bias in judgements towards the norm at intermediate duty
cycles and away from the norm at extreme duty cycles, which appears
moreover to be an inherently dynamic effect (section 3.2.2)? Our faith in
the proposed explanation might be shored up were we able to posit a plau-
sible neuronal mechanism by which this effect might arise. One possibility
that will be explored at some length is that lateral inhibition may provide
a mechanism which could account for at least some of the psychophysical
results presented in chapter 3.
Lateral inhibition has a long history in the study of mind, with the
seeds of the concept discernible in the writings of Descartes and contem-
poraries [Jacobson, 1993]. However, it began to be studied physiologically
and psychophysically only in the 20th Century, through the seminal work
of Georg von Be´ke´sy [Be´ke´sy, 1967] and others. Physiological and anatom-
ical studies demonstrate that lateral inhibition permeates the mammalian
visual system from the retina through to cortical and deep brain struc-
tures, indeed it appears to be an essentially universal feature of complex
nervous systems [Isaacson and Scanziani, 2011]. Despite these extensive
phenomenological investigations there remains uncertainty about the pre-
cise functional role of inhibition within nervous systems. Is it to inhibit
excitatory neurons that would otherwise destabilise into epileptic activ-
ity? Is it, as has been plausibly argued [Rolls and Treves, 1998], that lateral
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inhibition is crucial for the implementation of winner-takes-all competi-
tion in biological neural networks? Doubtless, as commonly found with
biological structures, multiple functions are supported. However, the re-
cent ascendancy of Bayesian approaches to neural computation, reviewed
at some length in chapter 1 section 1.4, provides a framework in which lo-
cal lateral inhibition can be understood as a crucial functional component
in probabilistic neural computation [Bill et al., 2015].
The concept of lateral inhibition is not new in the face recognition lit-
erature. For instance, the well known Interactive Activation and Com-
petition (IAC) model [Burton et al., 1990] posits a connectionist architec-
ture comprising pools of interactive simple processing units. Examples
include Face Recognition Unit (FRU), dealing with visual recognition, Per-
son Recognition Unit (PRU), involved in recognition from voice or other
modalities, and Person Identity Unit (PIU), key for the representation of
complex semantic information about an individual, beyond the modality
of recognition (e.g. whether they are a family member). Between pools of
these units there are excitatory links, allowing, say, the image of a person
to trigger the relevant FRU and subsequently PIUs. However, within pools
all units inhibit one another (i.e. laterally inhibit one another). In partic-
ular, regarding the model of face space developed in chapter 2, the IAC
model supposes that all FRUs mutually inhibit one another. In terms then
of a functional role, inhibition can be seen as enforcing the assumption that
faces only possess a single identity, implementing a kind of winner-takes-
all competition. Crucially, the experimental design of the DE violates this
basic assumption, since by design it involves two rapidly alternating but
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distinct entities.
In keeping with the IAC and other models allocating a central com-
putational role to inhibition in face perception, an interesting mechanis-
tic possibility for the centripetal radial deviation presented in chapter 2,
is suggested by rather beautiful work done in insect decision-making by
Seeley and colleagues [Seeley et al., 2012]. They studied populations of
honey bees, apis mellifera, making binary decisions about which of two
prospective nest sites to occupy. It had been well known for some time
that bees use the waggle dance not only to direct to food sources but also
to describe and thereby advocate a potential nesting site to other spectat-
ing bees. However, these researchers were directly inspired by the analogy
with neurons [Passino et al., 2008] to look for inhibitory cross signals be-
tween bees advocating, by waggle-dancing for, a particular site and those
advocating a different potential site. They found these cross-inhibitory
signals in the form of high frequency head butts delivered bidirectionally
between bees from competing parties, christened stop signals by the group.
The effect of receiving such a stop signal was to reduce the probability that
the recipient would continue repeating his waggle dance i.e. of his contin-
uing his advocacy for a particular site.
As part of their investigations Seeley and colleagues considered a num-
ber of candidate dynamical system models of the decision making pro-
cess, derived from their observations of bee behaviour. They found that
the best explanation of their data was provided by a so-called discriminate
stop signal model of decision making. Essentially this means that the stop
signals are not issued at random but to those bees committed to a compet-
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ing alternative, making the recipients more likely to become uncommitted.
Symbolically, where A and B represent two species (bees in this case) com-
mitted to alternatives ’A’ and ’B’ respectively,
A + B
αA−→ A + U (4.21)
and,
A + B
αB−→ B + U (4.22)
where αA and αB are rate constants.
Using a van Kampen expansion [Van Kampen, 2007] they derive the
following mean-field population-level differential equations.
dΨA
dt
= γA(1−ΨA −ΨB)−ΨA[αA − ρA(1−ΨA −ΨB) + σBΨB] (4.23)
dΨB
dt
= γB(1−ΨA −ΨB)−ΨB[αB − ρB(1−ΨA −ΨB) + σAΨA] (4.24)
Where ΨA and ΨB represent proportions of the population committed
to option A and B respectively. And where represents γi, αi, ρi and σi
represent rate constants for spontaneous commitment, spontaneous aban-
donment, recruitment and stop-signal induced abandonment respectively
(see supplementary material for reference [Seeley et al., 2012] for further
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details).
The dynamics implicit in these differential equations can be visualised
as a vector field, shown in figure 4.11. It can be appreciated that in a sit-
uation in which the ”best” option alternates, each transition will cause
the state of the system to converge to the opposite fixed point, which will
furthermore be reach via a curved, or bowed, trajectory. The suggestion
might be then that the alternation of distinct faces pushes the perceptual
state back and forth between the corresponding fixed points. However,
when this alternation is rapid, as in the case of the DE, the dynamics of
the system are such that instead of being suspended according to a lin-
ear interpolation between the stable states, the percept is suspended at a
position biased towards the origin. Thus, by analogy, it seems possible
that the underlying mechanism for the effect we see is some form of cross-
inhibition between populations of neurons differentially sensitive to face
A or face B.
The apparent similarity of decision making by populations of insects
and neurons is one emphasised by Seeley and colleagues [Seeley et al.,
2012] in their original paper, so much so that they describe the phenomenon
of (discriminate) stop signals as cross-inhibition, a term lifted unapologet-
ically from the neuronal literature and a synonym for lateral inhibition.
The functional importance of this cross-inhibition in the case of bees ap-
pears to be, inter alia, to rapidly break deadlocks. Without cross-inhibition
two very similar alternatives can result in the state of the system hovering
in equilibrium between the two options. In some models, such as drift
diffusion models, of decision making a deadlock of this kind will even-
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Figure 4.11: Illustration of the dynamics of a population of bees making a deci-
sion about two candidate nests, A and B, assuming a discriminate stop signal model
of decision making (see reference [Seeley et al., 2012]). Bees can be in one of
three states, committed to A, committed to B or uncommited. The horizontal and
vertical axes correspond to the proportion of bees committed to option A and B
respectively. The left panel illustrates the situation in which A is the preferable
option. So bees are more likely to become committed to A and, when committed,
waggle-dance more and issue more stop signals to bees committed to B. The right
panel shows the reverse situation in which B is the preferable option. By analogy
the situation in which A is dominant corresponds to stimulus/face A being pre-
sented, and likewise for B. Stable fixed points are represented by solid black dots,
on which surrounding vectors converge. If one considers the situation in which
A and B alternate then it is clear that the state of the system will shuttle back and
forth along a curved, or bowing, trajectory between A and B’s respective fixed
points. If the alternation is sufficiently rapid, as in the DE, then the state will not
have time to evolve fully to either stable state and will be suspended between
the two. Moreover, the suspension will not correspond to a linear interpolation
between states A and B, but will be biased towards the origin thanks to the effects
of lateral inhibition. Adapted from [Seeley et al., 2012]
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tually be broken by the effect of noise [Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008], but
unless the magnitude of the noise is relatively large this will take a pro-
hibitively long time. It may be argued that in most biologically relevant
circumstances simply making a decision, even randomly, is much more
adaptive that remaining paralysed by indecision between two similar al-
ternatives. A clearer perceptual analogue of this effect may be the many
well know bistable percepts, such as the Necker cube. Each interpretation
is equally plausible, yet only one is ”opted for” by our perceptual systems.
Inhibitory neuronal activity is a crucial component of most modelling ef-
forts to understand these phenomena, and recent work has provided evi-
dence that this is indeed the case in vivo [van Loon et al., 2013].
A question therefore is whether a network of neurons, driven by spe-
cific stimuli, and connected by reciprocal inhibitory connections can effect
Bayesian inference in a principled fashion. That this can indeed be done is
supported by work over the past decade, largely in the form of modelling
studies [Ma et al., 2006, Beck et al., 2008, Bill et al., 2015].
Even supposing that neuronal populations are capable in principal of
implementing Bayesian computations it remains to be shown that this is in
fact the path evolution has chosen. There is of course no a priori guarantee
that the somewhat rarefied principles of probabilistic inference predomi-
nated in the evolution, for all the current vogue in touting this as a unify-
ing framework for neuroscience. As Anderson observes, somewhat archly,
in The Adaptive Character of Thought: ”the gambler’s fallacy may lead some-
one to lose money in Las Vegas, but if it leads him to try for a third child
after two boys (because a girl is due), then it is quite adaptive” [Anderson,
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1990, p. 32].
Finally, in this chapter and the modelling therein we have addressed
only the bowing seen in the DE, and made no attempt to model the re-
sults of the CE. As demonstrated chapter 3 (see table 3.5 in section 3.3.4)
there is no statistically significant evidence of a bowing effect in the CE,
although there was evidence of a radial centrifugal effect as well as signif-
icant tangential deviations. The ability of the Bayesian model presented in
this chapter to replicate, to some extent at least, the bowing seen in the DE
stems chiefly from the combination of a variable likelihood with a strong
prior. In order then to replicate results in which this bowing is not seen it
is only necessary to eliminate the prior, or rather ”flatten” the prior. Given
that the model as currently described utilises a Gaussian prior it is unable
to converge to a truly flat prior, but only approximates it better and better
as the determinant of the covariance matrix increases. Thus an attempt
to fit the model directly to the CE will not result in convergence. Hav-
ing said that, however, Bayesian inference with a flat prior is equivalent
to maximum likelihood, which is exactly how the CE data are modelled
in figure 3.14 of chapter 3. Thus, a worthy avenue of further investiga-
tion would be to develop a single model that could account for both the
DE and the CE data without special manipulation of core model features,
such as the nature of the prior distribution in face space. The prior be-
ing, presumably, relatively static on the timescale of these experiments
(i.e. seconds/minutes). It is likely that developing such a model would
require modelling the dynamic nature of the stimuli itself, since it would
be necessary to represent the DE’s 200ms condition, the DE’s 100ms condi-
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tion and the CE within a single input representation. The CE can after all
be thought of as a version of the DE in which the period has been reduced
to 0 (i.e. infinitely fast alternations).
4.8 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that a simple Bayesian framework can ac-
count for certain otherwise rather perplexing results arising from the ex-
periments described in chapter 3. It has been convincingly demonstrated
at lower perceptual levels that Bayesian inference does appear to be a
widespread, if not ubiquitous, feature of perceptual inference [Knill and
Pouget, 2004]. However, if Bayesian inference is to act as a unifying prin-
ciple across domains of cognition it is crucial to demonstrate that it is a
feature of high level object recognition. This model, and the data it ap-
pears to account for, therefore represents a step in that direction. I have
previously noted the distance that exists between this model and the neu-
ronal mechanisms which must underlie all computation within the brain.
A natural direction for further research would thus be to explore how a
neuronal mechanism could implement such a Bayesian computation in
high dimensional face space. I have however drawn attention to some
recent work in swarm intelligence, which suggests a possible class of neu-
ronal mechanisms for this effect (i.e. cross-inhibition).
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A Comparison of Human Face
Space and Basel Face Space
The Basel Face Space (BFS) model has been utilised to perform the
experiments reported in chapter 3 as well as in multiple other stud-
ies. In this chapter results are presented from an experiment which
systematically probed the relationship between pairs of faces within
BFS and the judgements human subjects made regarding their per-
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ceived similarity. In assessing this relationship three central analyses
are performed. Firstly, a number of possible functions relating the
geometry of BFS to human subject similarity judgements are fitted,
and it is found that, of those considered, a logistic function appears
to produce the best correspondence. Secondly, the general question
of isotropy is addressed, and it is shown that a significant proportion
of the variance in responses is indeed explained by the absolute, as
opposed to the relative, geometry of pairs of faces. Together these re-
sults constitute a quantification of the degree to which BFS is a good,
albeit imperfect, model of human face space. Thirdly, a more specific
issue around isotropy, which for clarity we might call directionality,
is addressed, wherein it is shown that the gradient of dissimilarity
between pairs of faces, as a function of BFS distance, is significantly
greater in the tangential than the radial direction. In the discussion
some tentative conclusions are drawn.
5.1 Introduction
The concept of face space has been extensively discussed in previous chap-
ters and efforts have principally centred on the question of how infor-
mation is integrated over time (chapters 2 and 3), perhaps conforming
to Bayesian principles at some functional level (chapter 4). Throughout
the theoretical and experimental investigations described in those chap-
ters there has existed an implicit set of assumptions concerning face space,
in particular that BSF (Basel Face Space) provides a reasonable approxi-
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mation to the face space instantiated in the brain.
Recently, a body of work has arisen addressing the question of whether
modern computer vision approaches to object recognition share essen-
tial characteristics with biological object recognition [Khaligh-Razavi and
Kriegeskorte, 2014]. In this chapter this is explored by asking if one can
predict human perceptual judgements from their relative geometry and,
subsequently, whether absolute geometry in BFS is of additional signifi-
cance. This concerns the question of isotropy, and if in general it matters
from which angle a pair of faces are sampled, given some relative geome-
try. Persisting in this theme, a further issue relating to isotropy, for clarity
referred to with the antonym directionality, in face space is then addressed,
specifically whether there is a systematic difference between tangential
versus radial change in terms of perceptual similarity.
Previous work has addressed the issue of isotropy in face space, for
example [Ross et al., 2010]. Building on previous work (e.g. [Leopold
et al., 2001]), they argued that the anisotropy suggested by their results
supported a norm based coding model. Since then, however, further work
has shown that exemplar encoding can yield effects that were previously
thought to be characteristic only of norm based encoding schemes [Ross
et al., 2014]. Moreover, as discussed in chapter 1, the norm vs exemplar
debate, is not well motivated from a theoretical standpoint and indeed
proponents of the norm-based coding scheme have yet to propose a co-
herent ”norm” itself, in the sense of a metric. In this thesis an inference
from the experimental results contained in this chapter and the underly-
ing coding scheme is not attempted. It remains valid to note, however, that
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while results such as these may not obviously imply a particular coding
scheme (i.e. numerous models are consistent with these results) it does
constrain the set of possibles models, and is not therefore a completely
hopeless endeavour.
5.1.1 Experimental Design and Methods
This experiment addressed the question of whether reliable relationships
could be found between the geometry of faces within the BFS model and
the percept of similarity-versus-dissimilarity in human subjects. Pairs of
faces from BFS were generated and present on a large 43” touchscreen dis-
play (Panasonic TH-43LFE8-IR), which allowed subjects to drag the pairs
of faces, each face occupying approximately 1 degree of arc horizontally,
and each face pair separated by the same, from a siding onto a large cen-
tral arena for arrangement (see figure 5.1). Also present in the siding was
an ”identity” marker which the subject was instructed to place according
to where he/she felt the demarcation At the beginning of each trial 8 ran-
domly selected face pairs, along with the identity marker, were displayed
in the siding. Once all 9 of these items had been placed in the arena the
user terminated the trial by pressing a button marked ”Done” and a new
trial would begin (see figure 5.2). In a single session there were a total
of 232 face pairs presented, 29 trials of 8 face pairs per trial. All 26 sub-
jects completed 2 trials in which the same faces were presented but in a
shuffled order, so that a given face pair was usually (≈ 80% of the time 1)
1Although on any trial in session 2 it was most probable that at least one of the
(
8
2
)
= 28
possible pairings of face pairs occurred together in a trial in session 1
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Figure 5.1: Example screen shot of experimental display at the beginning of each
trial. The faces to be arranged are initially placed in a siding to the right of the
main arena in which arrangement takes place. Note the anchor faces, which are
pairs of identical faces (separation in BFS = 0) at the bottom of the screen and
pairs of anti-faces (separation in BFS = 80) at the top of the screen. These face
pairs cannot be moved but reinforce for the subject the perceptual continuum
between extremes of similarity and dissimilarity.
accompanied by 7 different face pairs in session 2 compared to session 1.
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Figure 5.2: Example screen shot of experimental display at the end of each trial.
Subjects can move the pairs from the siding across a large touch screen to any
point in the arena using their fingers. Faces are deposited at a location on the
arena corresponding to the internal similarity of each pair, and a marker denoting
the point beneath which all pairs are considered to be of the same identity (i.e. the
same person) is also positioned.
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For a subset of 15/26 of the subjects a third session, session 3, was
conducted in which 232 face pairs were presented in the same fashion as
in sessions 1 and 2. However in this case although the relative geome-
try of the pairs remained the same the vectors were resampled from high
dimensional face space so that on average they tended to be orthogonal
compared to those presented in sessions 1 and 2. Indeed, because the
space from which vectors are sampled is a 398 dimensional one can be
extremely confident that in every case the inner product of the mean vec-
tor from sessions 1 and 2 with that in session 3 was essentially 0 (i.e. or-
thogonal). This manipulation allowed the question of just how much the
intrinsic geometry of BFS determined the perceptual similarity to be ad-
dressed. If the relative geometry were of little importance, and absolute
geometry was instead the chief determinant of perceptual similarity, then
there should be a much better correlation between judgements in sessions
1 and 2 (which share both relative and absolute geometry) than between 1
and 3 or 2 and 3 (which share only relative geometry). On the other hand if
relative geometry were the chief determinant of perceptual similarity then
there should be comparable correlations between all sessions, since they
share the same relative geometry.
Within the full Basel Face Model a particular face corresponds to a sin-
gle 398 dimensional vector or, to put the same thing another way, a point
in 398 dimensional real space R398. If we consider any two vectors then
we can describe their absolute location with 2 such 398 element vectors.
However their relative geometry can also be expressed by the lengths of
the vectors r1 and r2 and the angle between them θ. Thus we can charac-
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r1
r2
θ
Figure 5.3: Any pair of vectors emanating from the origin lie in a 2D plane within
high dimensional space. We can fully characterise their relative geometry in terms
of three numbers, corresponding to the length of the two vectors, their radii r1,
r2, and the angle between them θ.
terise the relative geometry of two faces within BFS compactly in terms of
a tuple (r1, r2, θ) of three real numbers 2. This characterisation of relative
geometry is illustrated in figure 5.3.
Relative geometry in these terms can be visualised as a 3D parameter
space wherein the 3 axes correspond to the three parameters r1, r2 and
2A tuple is a finite list of ordered elements. Notice that in fact r1, r2 need not be
ordered since in terms of relative geometry (r1, r2, θ) is equivalent to (r2, r1, θ).
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θ. Each point in this space corresponds to a definite angle and pair of
vector lengths i.e. a particular relative configuration or geometry within
BFS. Because of the relative nature of this characterisation there are then
an infinite number of pairs of faces which satisfy any given configuration,
excepting the situation in which both vectors r1 and r2 are the null vector.
Because the parameter space for relative geometry is continuous it would
require impracticably large quantities of data to characterise it fully by em-
pirical methods, so it is necessary to select some sampling scheme whereby
a full characterisation can be approximated by making certain assump-
tions, like that the function changes only relatively slowly w.r.t. parameter
space. Secondly, one is confronted with the issue of whether the sampling
should take place in BFS or in the parameter space itself. There are many
considerations to reflect upon in this regard, but an illustrative difficulty
is to consider how well our parameter space would be characterised were
we to sample i.i.d. pairs of faces randomly from a 398 dimensional Gaus-
sian within BFS. A moment’s reflection reveals that this would result in a
dense sampling of pairs of approximately orthogonal vectors (at θ ≈ pi/2)
and extremely sparse sampling of pairs forming more acute or obtuse an-
gles due to the very high dimensionality of BFS. For reasons such as this
a deterministic grid-sampling procedure was adopted, conducted within
parameter space rather than BFS itself. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 illustrate the
scheme settled upon, an 8-by-8-by-8 regular grid of parameter space.The
reason why a denser grid than 8 per axis was not used is that for a den-
sity, d, the number of unique points within such a grid is proportional
to d3. The reason why the number of unique points (i.e. unique relative
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Figure 5.4: The relative geometry of two vectors can be represented as a point
in three dimensional parameter space. This figures shows parameter space with
axes, r1 r2 and θ. r1-by-r2 slices are stacked along θ (in radians), representing an
8-by-8-by-8 grid sampling of three dimensional parameter space. Colours from
deep blue to bright yellow represent Euclidean distance in BFS. See also figure 5.5
which shows these slices laid out individually from the bottom (θ = 0) up.
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geometries) is not exactly d3 is that there is redundancy within the param-
eter space, which is consequently non-uniform in the sense that if we were
to simply sample each point from the grid some n number of times then
there would again be some relative geometries which would be sampled
more often than others. For example there is only one point in parameter
space corresponding to the situation in which the separation between two
points (a pair of faces) in BFS is equal to 80, when the tuple (r1, r2, θ) =
(40, 40, pi). In figure 5.4 this is the furthest (and most yellow) square in the
topmost slice (θ = pi); in figure 5.5 the top right point in the bottom right
panel. In contrast for any situation in which r1 6= r2 the tuples (r1, r2, θ)
and (r2, r1, θ) are geometrically equivalent in BFS but correspond to differ-
ent points in parameter space. In fact they are reflections of one another in
the plane r1 = r2. These redundancies correspond to the axis of symmetry
(r1=r2) seen in all of the slices in figure 5.5 and to the fact that the most
leftward columns and bottom rows are identical within and between the
slices. There is another axis of symmetry (r1 + r2 = 40) in the upper left
panel of figure 5.5, but this does not in fact correspond to a redundancy
in relative geometry. Instead, this represents faces separated only in terms
of eccentricity (i.e. the angle between the vectors is 0). Once these redun-
dancies have been eliminated it turns out that a total of 232 unique points
characterise parameter space.
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5.2 Results
5.2.1 Predicting Human Judgements from Basel Face Space
Were BFS (Basel Face Space) a perfect representation of human face space
then we would expect to find a linear relationship connecting the distance
between two faces in BFS and the subjective dissimilarity to a human sub-
ject. In order to probe this issue we fitted a number of functions to the data
acquired in our experiments. We fitted both linear and non-linear models.
These were of the following form, where dh denotes human dissimilar-
ity judgements and db denotes Euclidean distance in Basel Face Space.
Firstly,
dh = m · db + c (5.1)
a simple linear model, which corresponds to the situation in which
Basel face space is an essentially perfect model of human face space.
Next we have a sigmoid function
dh =
1
1 + exp{−m · db + c} (5.2)
which is essentially the linear regression model passed through a ”squash-
ing function”.
Next we have a logarithmic function
dh = ln(m · db + c) (5.3)
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and then an exponential function
dh = exp(m · db + c) (5.4)
These functions were all fitted using Matlab’s inbuilt non-linear fitting
tool, and the results can be seen in figure 5.6.
Finally I fitted a further function, but which took as inputs three vari-
ables: the length of two vectors and the angle between them, denoted r1,
r2, and θ. A linear combination of these three variables (plus a bias term
a3), passed through a sigmoid function yielded the output of the function.
I call this the ”polar model”, since the inputs reflect the relative polar co-
ordinates. This had the following form
f(r1, r2, θ) =
1
1 + exp{a0 · r1 + a1 · r2 + a2 · θ + a3} (5.5)
This function cannot be represented in the same was as those preceding
it and displayed in figure 5.6, since it takes not one but three arguments.
In order to assess the goodness-of-fit the residuals were for each model,
along with the MSE (Mean Squared Error), computed using 4-fold cross
validation. Both the residuals and the MSEs are displayed in figure 5.7.
Regarding the MSE the sigmoid model surpasses the other models, closely
followed by the linear model. This is supported by the proportion of vari-
ance explained by each model (i.e. R2), printed above each corresponding
bar. With regards to the residuals only the logistic, the linear and the po-
lar models could be construed visually, at first blush, as approximating
a Gaussian. The other two models (logarithmic and exponential) show
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Figure 5.6: All judgements for all subjects. Euclidean distance is plotted on the
abscissa against perceptual dissimilarity on the ordinal. In each panel a differ-
ent function has been fitted to the data. From top left to bottom right these
correspond to the linear model eq. 5.1, the logarithmic model eq. 5.3, the sig-
moid/logistic eq. model 5.2, and the exponential model eq. 5.4.
clearly non-Gaussian signs, such as being bimodal and /or skewed. How-
ever, an Anderson-Darling test for normality (see table 5.1) does not sup-
port the assumption of normality for any of the models, so strictly none of
them passes muster in terms of producing Gaussian residuals. That said,
the relative magnitudes of the test statistic in each case suggests that the
polar (2.7), logistic (18.7) and linear (30.6) models are much closer to nor-
mality that the exponential (115.2) or logarithmic (221.7), so in this sense
the models could be meaningfully ranked.
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Model H0 AD test statistic p-value
Linear 1 30.6 <0.001
Logistic 1 18.7 <0.001
Logarithmic 1 221.7 <0.001
Exponential 1 115.2 <0.001
Polar 1 2.7 <0.001
Table 5.1: Results of an Anderson-Darling test for normality of residuals. The
null hypothesis of normally distributed residuals is rejected for all of the models
at a significance level of 0.05. The test statistic, given in column three, provides
some insight into the strength of the evidence against normality in each case. The
polar model yields the smallest, while the logarithmic model yields a test statistic
nearly two orders of magnitude greater.
In summary, of the models assessed none yields convincingly normal
residuals, as assessed by the Anderson-Darling test for normality (table
5.1). However, the linear, the logistic and the polar models, assessed by
the magnitude of the Anderson-Darling test statistic, are much closer to
normality than the exponential and logarithmic models. The MSE analy-
sis reinforces this point quantitatively, in that the models displaying the
most non-Gaussian residuals also display the highest error, but suggests
that overall the logistic model is slightly superior to the linear and po-
lar models. However, a complication is that superior model as assessed
by MSE (logistic) is different from the superior model as assessed by the
Anderson-Darling test statistic (polar). Suffice to say that this is not the
first time a psychometric curve has approximated a sigmoid (assessed by
MSE), however it is interesting that a model based on polar coordinates
provides a good fit in terms of the normality of residuals. Further work
could seek to elucidate the apparent tension between model performance
assessed by MSE and by the Anderson-Darling test. Overall, this analysis
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supports the contention that there really is shared structure between bio-
logical face space and BFS. Subsequent sections will further explore and
quantify this relationship, in particular by addressing questions around
isotropy or directionality in face space.
5.2.2 Relative and Absolute Geometry in Biological and
Basel Face Space
The experimental design, whereby a subset of 15 of the subjects repeated
the experiment with identical geometry but a resampled set of particu-
lar faces, allowed us to test a certain aspect of isotropy. In particular, it
allowed us to ask the following question: does the relative geometry of
two faces in face space account for the variability we see in judgements,
beyond the effects of noise in subjects’ judgements? Were relative geome-
try the sole determinant of perceptual similarity, then the correlations be-
tween a pair of sessions in which the same faces are used (i.e. constant rel-
ative and absolute geometry across sessions) and a pair of session in which
different faces are used, but relative geometry is held constant across ses-
sions, should be the same. In contrast, insofar as absolute geometry is a
determinant of perceptual similarity we should see a corresponding re-
duction in the correlation between two session in which the absolute ge-
ometry is changed, compared to sessions in which both the relative and
absolute geometries are shared.
Figures 5.8 and 5.9 display the results of such a correlational analysis,
using two separate measurements, the Pearson and the Spearman coeffi-
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2
0.852
0.7600.753
Figure 5.8: Pearson correlation coefficients between sessions 1, 2 (red) and 3
(green) for 15 subjects who completed an additional 3rd session in which the rel-
ative geometries of face pairs were preserved but resampled randomly from BFS.
Note that the Pearson correlations between sessions 1 and 2 are significantly (see
table 5.4) higher, 0.852 (0.8425, 0.8607), than those between sessions 1 and 3, 0.753
(0.7382, 0.767), and sessions 2 and 3, 0.760 (0.7454, 0.7735). cf. figure 5.9
1
3
2
0.846
0.7430.738
Figure 5.9: Spearman correlation coefficients (and 95% confidence intervals) be-
tween sessions 1, 2 (red) and 3 (green). The non-parametric Spearman correla-
tions show the same patterns as the Pearson correlations. Spearman correlations
between sessions 1 and 2 are significantly (see table 5.5) higher, 0.846 (CI: 0.8247,
0.8668), than those between sessions 1 and 3, 0.738 (CI: 0.7170, 0.7590), and ses-
sions 2 and 3, 0.743 (CI: 0.7221, 0.7641). cf. figure 5.8
cients respectively. Sessions 1 and 2 (red) consisted of identical geometries
and identical faces, while for session 3 (green) the relative geometry was
preserved, but the faces were randomly resampled from Basel face space,
being typically orthogonal therefore. Figure 5.8 displays the Pearson cor-
relation coefficients between all three sessions, for all subjects.
There was a significantly lower correlation between sessions in which
different faces were used, 0.753 (0.7382, 0.767) & 0.760 (0.7454, 0.7735), ver-
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sus those in which the same faces were used, 0.852 (0.8425, 0.8607), sug-
gesting the assumption of isotropy is, strictly speaking, false. The results
of this analysis are presented in table 5.2 and an analogous analysis, based
on the Spearman correlation and with the same conclusions, is presented
in table 5.3.
Sessions compared Pearson (CI) H0 p
1-2 0.852 (0.8425, 0.8607) 1 < 0.001
1-3 0.753 (0.7382, 0.767) 1 < 0.001
2-3 0.760 (0.7454, 0.7735) 1 < 0.001
Table 5.2: Pearson correlation coefficients (and 95% confidence intervals) com-
puted, between all permutations of session pairs, for 15 subjects who completed
all three sessions (1, 2 and 3). H0 denotes the null hypothesis of a correlation of 0,
and p the associated p-value. cf. figure 5.8
Sessions compared Spearman (CI) H0 p
1-2 0.846 (0.8247, 0.8668) 1 <0.001
1-3 0.738 (0.7170, 0.7590) 1 < 0.001
2-3 0.743 (0.7221, 0.7641) 1 < 0.001
Table 5.3: Spearman correlation coefficients (and 95% confidence intervals) com-
puted, between all permutations of session pairs, for 15 subjects who completed
all three sessions (1, 2 and 3). H0 denotes the null hypothesis of a correlation of 0,
and p the associated p-value. cf. figure 5.9.
Although by doing so we, strictly speaking, acquire no new informa-
tion, we can obtain a slightly different perspective by converting Pearson
coefficients into explained variance,R2. Doing so we can say that the abso-
lute geometry accounts for R2a = 0.8522 = 0.73 = 73% of variance, whereas
relative geometry accounts for R2r = 0.752 = 0.57 = 57%. This leaves a
residue of 16% of variance which can be attributed to the absolute geome-
try of pairs of faces. This is confirmed by an ANOVA for both Pearson and
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Spearman correlations, the results of which are presented in tables 5.4 and
5.5.
Geometry R2 Explained variance (CI) H0 p
Absolute (A) 0.73 73 (71, 75)% - -
Relative (R) 0.57 57 (55, 59)% - -
∆ (A-R) - 16 (13, 19) % 1 < 0.001
Table 5.4: ANOVA for absolute versus relative geometry based on estimates of
Pearson correlation coefficients (presented in table 5.2). The null hypothesis, H0,
is that there is no difference between explained variances (i.e. that the ∆ = 0). cf.
table 5.5
Geometry R2 Explained variance (CI) H0 p
Absolute (A) 0.72 72 (68, 75)% - -
Relative (R) 0.55 55 (52, 58)% - -
∆ (A-R) - 17 (12, 21)% 1 < 0.001
Table 5.5: ANOVA for absolute versus relative geometry based on estimates of
Spearman correlation coefficients (presented in table 5.3). The null hypothesis,
H0, is that there is no difference between explained variances (i.e. that the ∆ = 0)
cf. table 5.4
16% perhaps provides a more intuitively graspable and memorable fig-
ure with which to quantify the size of the effect. The broad conclusion is
that the absolute geometry does indeed add significant information over
an above the relative geometry, but that this information gain is relatively
small compared to the information already present in the relative geome-
try.
This conclusion, namely that absolute geometry does provide some ad-
ditional information, is echoed by the analysis in which the Spearman cor-
relation coefficients between sessions were computed, shown in table 5.3
and figure 5.9. The Spearman test makes no requirement of linearity, only
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monotonicity, and is therefore less demanding in its assumptions. How-
ever, as can be seen the numbers are essentially indistinguishable (i.e. have
overlapping confidence intervals) from those obtained in the Pearson anal-
ysis. This suggests that whatever the (presumably) monotonic function re-
lating BFS to biological face space (for example those shown in figure 5.6)
it is unlikely to affect the correlation analysis presented here.
It may therefore be reasonable to assume isotropy as a biased approx-
imation. This is based on the result that the majority of the available in-
formation is contained within the relative geometry, but clearly not all. It
would of course be important, when designing experiments using BFS to
ensure that the experimental paradigm is not sensitive to this, relatively
small, violation in the assumption of isotropy. At any rate, the fact that the
violation is now quantified means that experimentalists are henceforth in a
position to simulate their proposed design and assess whether isotropy is
likely to be an issue in advance. The following section, i.e. 5.2.3, addresses
a further issue related to isotropy, namely the equivalence, or otherwise, of
tangential versus radial distance in BFS and biological or perceptual face
space.
5.2.3 Tangential and Radial Distance in Basel and Percep-
tual Face Space
Figure 5.10 gives a summary of the combined similarity judgements ob-
tained for all 26 subjects. Here each panels shows how similarity judge-
ments vary with reference to a reference face at an eccentricity that in-
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creases in steps from the ”norm” face at the origin (upper left) to a point
(i.e. a face) within the surface of the hyper-sphere bounding the sam-
ple space from which all faces were drawn (bottom right). The colours,
cool for similar, warm for dissimilar, indicate how subjective dissimilarity
varies with Euclidean distance in BFS, with respect to a reference face. An
obvious question is: does perceptual similarity vary in the same way at the
centre of BFS as at the periphery? We can begin to address this question
by fitting a paraboloid bowl to the data for a given eccentricity, denoted by
the scalar value l. At each eccentricity we are interested in the form of the
paraboloid which has a value of 0 at the reference face so we can constrain
the general form of the paraboloid as follows:
z = A(x− l)2 +By2 (5.6)
where z corresponds to dissimilarity, x represents position on the axis
of the radial vector (x = ±|r|), y the position on the orthogonal axis (i.e.
parallel to the tangential vector) (y = ±|r⊥|), and as stated previously l
is a scalar representing the eccentricity of the reference face. A and B
are the parameters which control the rapidity with which dissimilarity
increases with distance in BFS. Higher values of A or B corresponds to
steeper paraboloids, which can be appreciated by observing that the par-
tial derivatives of z with respect to x and y are
∂z
∂x
= 2Ax− 2Al (5.7)
and
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∂z
∂y
= 2By (5.8)
So the second partial derivatives are
∂2z
∂x2
= 2A (5.9)
∂2z
∂y2
= 2B (5.10)
So we can see that the curvature in x is proportional to A, while the
curvature in y is proportional to B. In order to obtain this figure however,
we first need to fit the model to our data.
Because formula 5.6 is linear in the parameters A and B we can fit
directly using closed form linear regression. i.e. where
βˆ =
Aˆ
Bˆ
 (5.11)
X =

x21 y
2
1
x22 y
2
2
...
...
x2n y
2
n

(5.12)
and
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z =

z1
z2
...
zn

(5.13)
Then the (least mean squares) estimate of the parameters βˆ is given by
the closed form
βˆ = (X>X)−1X>z (5.14)
Using this formula to fit a series of appropriately constrained paraboloids
to the data we obtain a pair of parameter values for each eccentricity (|r|).
The fitted paraboloids are plotted in three dimensions at each eccentricity
|r| in figure 5.11 and the corresponding parameter values are plotted as a
function of |r| in figure 5.12. In figure 5.12 we can thus appreciate how the
curvature of the fitted paraboloid decreases with increasing eccentricity.
In keeping with previous findings, which utilised a different experimental
approach, [Ross et al., 2010] the curvature is, at all positive eccentricities,
i.e. |r| > 0, greater in the tangential direction than in the radial. An-
other way of putting this might be to say that subjects are less sensitive
to changes in the radial direction than to those in the tangential direction.
This observation is verified and quantified by the analysis presented in
figure 5.12.
A further nuance, that can be appreciated visually from figure 5.12, is
that not only are subjects less sensitive to change in the radial than the tan-
178
gential direction, but the magnitude of the difference becomes greater and
greater with increasing eccentricity. This can be appreciated by expressing
the corresponding curvatures as ratios. The phenomenon is quantified in
figure 5.13, where a highly significant linear increase is seen in the ratios
of curvatures expressed as a function of eccentricity (Pearson CC = 0.95;
p < 0.001). This was something that was not made explicit in previous
results [Ross et al., 2010], and indeed it is only possible to see this effect as
a consequence of the novel methodology here adopted. It is an open ques-
tion, and a worthy avenue of further study, as to what coding scheme’s
could account for this feature of the data.
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Eccentricty Curvature in r (CI) Curvature in r⊥ (CI) H0 p
0 0.6607 (0.6509, 0.6770) 0.6602 (0.6476, 0.6806) 0 0.478
5.7 0.5301 (0.5127, 0.6074) 0.5929 (0.5074, 0.6123) 1 < 0.001
11.4 0.4425 (0.4329, 0.5946) 0.5798 (0.4247, 0.6026) 1 < 0.001
17.1 0.3690 (0.3586, 0.5072) 0.4959 (0.3501, 0.5159) 1 < 0.001
22.9 0.3229 (0.3126, 0.4773) 0.4652 (0.3005, 0.4887) 1 < 0.001
28.6 0.2897 (0.2824, 0.4016) 0.3957 (0.2712, 0.4125) 1 < 0.001
34.3 0.2495 (0.2425, 0.4500) 0.4452 (0.2276, 0.4640) 1 < 0.001
40 0.2257 (0.2197, 0.4284) 0.4209 (0.2032, 0.4449) 1 < 0.001
Table 5.6: Results of t-test comparison of means using 29 independent estimates
of parameter values (from 29 subjects). As would be expected, at the origin (ec-
centricity 0)all directions are radial by definition, and there is no statistically sig-
nificant difference when (arbitrary) orthogonal directions are compared (allowing
one of the pair to be considered tangential for the purpose of analysis). However,
at eccentricities > 0 there is a reduction in curvature in both the radial and tan-
gential directions, but a reduction which is much more pronounced in the radial
than the tangential directions. (CI) denotes confidence intervals, H0 the null hy-
pothesis of no difference between means, and 0 or 1 in the fourth column denotes
acceptance or rejection of H0 repsectively. All curvature values are multiplied by
1,000 for clarity of presentation. See also figure 5.12
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Figure 5.13: The ratios of curvatures (i.e. row 3 divided by row 2 of table 5.6) as a
function of eccentricity. There is an approximately monotonic, positive and linear
trend, suggesting that not only is the radial curvature less than the tangential
curvature, but that this difference is magnified as a function of distance. This
linear trend is highly significant (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.95; p < 0.001)
5.3 Discussion
In subsection 5.2.1 the question was addressed of how well human dis-
similarity judgements could be predicted from the ”dissimilarity” in BFS.
A number of different models we adduced, most of which utilised the BFS
Euclidean distance between faces as the input, and outputted a predic-
tion between 0 and 1 (0 being identical, 1 being antifaces). Consideration
of both the MSE and the residuals would seem to favour the logistic and
polar models, respectively, as the best approximations, as can be appreci-
ated from figures 5.6 and 5.7. However, an obvious objection is that this
analysis considered only five possible models (linear, logistic, logarithmic,
exponential, and polar; see subsection 5.2.1 ). While it is impossible, in the
absence of more information, to derive analytically the ”true” function re-
lating BFS to biological face space, one suggestion would be to train a neu-
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ral network to perform the mapping between BFS biological face space,
which, by the Universal Approximation Theorem, can approximate any con-
tinuous function [Jordan and Bishop, 2014]. However, quite apart from
the absence of any guarantee that this function can in fact be learned, it is
quite unclear what the success or failure of such as exercise would estab-
lish beyond the conservative conclusion that there is a highly non-random
relationship between BFS and biological face space.
Subsection 5.2.2 addressed the question of the relative contribution of
relative and absolute geometry to predicting perceptual judgements. It
was found that the absolute geometry did indeed account for some of the
explained variance, evidenced by a significantly lower correlation coef-
ficient between sessions in which only the relative geometry was shared
compared to sessions in which both absolute and relative geometry were
shared. This was found to be true regardless of whether the Pearson corre-
lation (see figure5.8) or the Spearman correlation (see figure5.9) was used,
arguing that this is a fairly robust result.
An interesting finding from the analysis presented in subsection 5.2.3
is the observation that perceptual dissimilarity increases as a function of
distance in BFS less rapidly in the radial direction (i.e. r) than in the tan-
gential direction (i.e. r⊥), depicted graphically in figure 5.12 and visually
in figure 5.11. Visually it can be appreciated from figure 5.11 that the fitted
paraboloids become shallower with eccentricity, and furthermore that the
gradient in the radial axis flattens more slowly that that in the gradient
in the tangential axis (see figure 5.13). A related finding, albeit obtained
by a different experimental approach, was described in a 2010 paper by
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Ross and colleagues [Ross et al., 2010]. They showed that discrimination
between two faces was better when they lay on different radial vectors
than when they both lay on the same vector within face space, for some
given Euclidean distance. They further argued that this implied support
for a norm based coding scheme since ”vector angle is important in face
perception” [Ross et al., 2010]. It seems to be true that angle matters in
face perception, an assertion that could perhaps have been made prior to
this thesis, but it is less obvious what neural coding scheme this implies.
As previously noted, a coherent metric for norm based coding has yet
to be adduced, and as Burton and Volkey have argued, intuitions can be
treacherous when contemplating high dimensional spaces. Thus, biolog-
ically plausible simulations are required to underpin experimental find-
ings [Burton and Vokey, 1998]. Indeed, recent simulation work from the
Poggio lab suggests that the width of tuning curves may be a much more
important parameter than the distribution of tuning preferences in terms
of explaining the central psychophysical properties of face perception [Tan
and Poggio, 2016]. In light of these observations, then, a natural direction
in which to pursue further work would be to fit a range of physiologically
informed neural models to the data obtained. Such a study would be par-
ticularly propitious in light of the fact that, while this data is consonant in
certain respects to previous research, it has been acquired through a novel
experimental paradigm that enables systematic examination of parameter
space. The results of this approach, in particular the finding that the ratio
of curvatures changes systematically as a function of eccentricity, go some
way to providing the type and degree of constraint required for such an
185
exercise (biologically plausible simulations) to succeed.
In summary, the results presented in this chapter firstly provide an as-
sessment of how well BFS (Basel Face Space) maps onto human face space.
As might have been expected a priori the correspondence turns out to be
good, but far from perfect. Furthermore the demonstration of anisotropy
provided by the analysis in section 5.2.2 (i.e. that absolute geometry plays
some role in determining perceptual similarity) suggests that there may be
systematic differences in the way that faces are represented in BFS, rather
than it, say, being a noisy but unbiased estimator of human judgements.
At bottom then, for researchers contemplating using BFS (Basel Face
Space), these results counsel caution in assuming models such as BFS to
be accurate approximations to the human representation. However they
also demonstrate that the correlation may be sufficiently large that many
studies can usefully reply on such a correspondence.
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6
Conclusion
6.1 Summary of Theoretical and Experimental Re-
sults
This chapter summarises the main theoretical and empirical findings
of the preceding chapters. The chief strengths and weaknesses of the
results are highlighted and assessed as a whole. Likewise, several
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improvements in experimental design regarding the work in chap-
ter 3, now evident in hindsight, are enumerated. And finally, fertile
avenues for future investigation are identified.
Following the literature review presented in chapter 1, the original
work of this thesis begins, in chaper 2, with a speculative model of how
information might be integrated over time in face space. The empirical,
mainly neurophysiological, support for such as model was discussed, cit-
ing circumstantial but supportive evidence, such as the exponential decay
seen in the dynamics of neuronal firing throughout much of the nervous
system. Additionally, a normative motivation was drawn from results in
statistical time series analysis, in particular exponential smoothing, which
is a special case of the well-known Kalman filter. It was shown through
simulations that this relatively simple state space model could account for
some of the core phenomena observed in the psychophysical literature
around face perception, including adaptation, priming, and the skewed
reaction time distributions seen in two-alternative forced choice experi-
ments. It was also demonstrated, in subsection 2.6.1, that a readout mech-
anism could be used in such a state space, based on accumulator models
of decision making and accommodating phenomena such as identification
and misidentification of an individual.
One of the strengths of a well-defined model, which can be simulated
in a mathematical programming language such as Matlab, is that it can
be probed using essentially arbitrary inputs. Moreover, results can be
obtained, and iterated upon, rapidly. This allows hypotheses to be ex-
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plored easily without the arduous, though ultimately desirable, process
of deriving analytical, closed-form conclusions where possible. Accord-
ingly, although the experimental prediction chosen for empirical verifica-
tion/falsification was a relatively simple one (i.e. that a rapidly alternating
stimulus would give rise to a linearly interpolated percept, dependent on
the duty cycle of a pair of stimuli), the model allows arbitrarily complex
inputs to be assessed, where confident intuition surely breaks down.
The empirical work presented in chapter 3 rested on the prediction
that the percept of facial identity can be titrated to approximate any in-
terpolated point between two alternating stimuli. It transpired that the
empirical results differed considerably in both the radial and the tangen-
tial directions, as shown figures 3.15 on page 109 and 3.16 on page 111
respectively. Frequentist statistics were used to confirm the significance
of these deviations from the model predictions, leaving the question of
what the correct account of the findings was an open one. One option,
discussed in section 3.4, was that there was a learning effect, possible be-
cause a finite set of pair of faces (10) was used in the experimental design
so that subjects became familiar with the stimuli as the experiment pro-
ceeded. Relatedly, being conceived and performed only subsequently to
the results of the DE, the CE was performed after the DE and it is therefore
possible that apparent abolition of the so-called bowing effect was depen-
dent on the temporal order of the experiments (i.e. the amount of learning
that had occurred prior to the commencement of each experiment would
differ systematically between the DE and the CE).
A conspicuous feature of the deviations from model predictions in the
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radial direction is a pronounced centripetal deviation at intermediate duty
cycles (30 - 70%) and and equally pronounced centrifugal deviation at
more extreme duty cycles (0-10% and 90-100%). This pattern of deviation
was dubbed ”bowing”, and is arguably the most curious feature of the
data obtained in the DE, since the centripetal component is absent in the
CE while, apparently, all other identified characteristics of the data have
been preserved, including the centrifugal deviation at the pattern of tan-
gential deviations. The key difference in the experimental design between
the DE and the CE, at least insofar as it was intended, was that in the stim-
ulus was not static in the DE. Indeed, every effort was made to keep the
experiments identical except for this particular feature, so as to address
the question of whether the dynamic component is responsible for the ob-
served centripetal deviation. Given that the CE also consisted of a titrated
merging of stimuli it is hard not to conclude that the dynamic element is
the crucial one. Nor could the resulting centripetal effect be considered
small, reaching a magnitude of ≈15% (i.e. as a proportion of the distance
to the origin; see table 3.3 on page 90) at its maximum, achieved at a duty
cycle of 50%. This is approximately 50% greater than the largest centrifu-
gal effect seen at around 10% (see table 3.5 on page 106).
At the time this finding (i.e. centripetal deviation dependent on dy-
namic stimuli) was made it seemed possible, indeed likely, that this was
a Bayesian effect, due to the increased uncertainty implicit in a rapidly
changing stimulus. While this does remain plausible, and constitutes the
motivation for chapter 4, the possibility that a learning effect could ac-
count for this data should have been eliminated prior to investing heavily
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in a modelling effort. This would be an important component of future
experimental work, were it to be undertaken.
The advantages of hindsight to one side, chapter 4 represents an effort
to understand the centrifugal deviation found in the DE within a norma-
tive, probabilistic framework. The basic idea is that, whatever dynamical
system implements inference within perceptual face, space, the degree of
uncertainty, or entropy, in the stimulus varies as a function of the duty
cycle. The precise sense in which this is true is somewhat subtle, for ex-
ample because the duty cycle is strictly speaking deterministic rather than
stochastic, but we obtained some insight by modelling the stimulus as a
Bernoulli random variable. The entropy of a Bernoulli random variable,
varies as a function of the parameter p (see figure 4.1 on page 121), and it
was supposed that the entropy of the stimulus varied similarly as a func-
tion of the duty cycle. On the basis of this simple assumption the chap-
ter develops a Bayesian inferential model of face perception, the param-
eters of which were subsequently fitted using the DE data and a MCMC
(Markov Chain Monte Carlo) based approach. It was found that the model
could replicate certain features of the data, namely the radial centrifugal
and centripetal effects. The fact that the model could account for the cen-
trifugal deviations cannot be seen as surprising, since it was achieved by
virtue of a simple bias parameter (see description of p6 in section 4.4 begin-
ning on page 123). However, the centripetal effect arises as a consequence
of a static, strong prior and a process of Bayesian inference (see figures 4.8,
4.9 and 4.10 on pages 140, 141 and 142). Notwithstanding its success in this
regard, a weakness of the model was that it could not be fitted to the CE
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experimental data without modification. The required modification is en-
forcing a flat prior, which is strictly speaking impossible with a Gaussian
distribution and finite covariance matrix. Moreover, using a flat prior is
equivalent to performing maximum likelihood fitting, which is precisely
the fit performed in chapter 3 (see figure 3.14 on page 108). Thus the model
can be adapted to account for the CE data, but in a manner of speaking
the cure is worse that the disease, since the required adaptation involves
eliminating the core of the model, namely the combination of a strong (i.e.
informative) and static prior with a variable likelihood (i.e. data of a vary-
ing entropy) through a process of Bayesian inference. A further weakness
of the Bayesian model presented in chapter 4 is that it has almost no capa-
bility to account for the very significant tangential deviations, from linear
interpolation, seen in the data from both the CE and the DE. Indeed the
maximum magnitude of the tangential deviations in these experiments is
approximately twice that (≈30%) of the maximum radial deviation seen
in either the DE or the CE (≈15%) (see tables 3.5, pg 106, and 3.3, pg 90,
and figures 3.6, pg 94, and 3.16, pg 111). It would seem that some kind
of nonlinearity is at play here, and certainly, the pattern and magnitude
of tangential deviations must be seen as a further nail in the coffin with
regard to the prediction of linear interpolation derived from the exponen-
tial smoothing model of chapter 2. Accordingly, a worthy course of future
investigation might be to look into the possible causes of this tangential
deviation and probe it further experimentally.
Chapter 5, addresses in part one of the key assumptions underlying the
experimental approach inherent in both the DE and CE as well as dozens
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of other articles present in the face space literature, namely the validity of
Basel Face Space (BFS) as an approximation of human face space. This is
a crucial assumption to test since many experimental paradigms, includ-
ing the one adopted in chapter 3, depend upon BFS or similarly conceived
models for the validity of their inferential process. To put things the other
way, if these models do not correspond, at least to some significant degree,
to biological face space, then it is nigh on impossible to draw conclusions
based on their use. Encouragingly, it was found that the BFS does indeed
display a high correlation with human judgements, with correlation coef-
ficients in the neighbourhood of 0.8-0.85 and highly statistically significant
(see tables 5.2, pg 171, and 5.3, pg 171). It was further shown, by perform-
ing a subsequent experimental manipulation on a subset of 15 subjects,
that even where the experimental stimuli were resampled so as to preserve
only the relative and not the absolute geometry the correlations remained
high and significant, in the range 0.73-0.76 (see tables 5.2, pg 171, and 5.3,
pg 171 , and figures 5.8, pg 170, and 5.9, pg 170 ). That said, the reduc-
tion in correlation seen between sessions wherein stimuli preserved abso-
lute and relative geometry and those in which only relative geometry was
preserved was itself highly significant and as shown though an ANOVAs
(see tables 5.4, pg 172, and 5.5, pg 172). The conclusion, albeit somewhat
qualified, was that BFS is a reasonable but imperfect approximation to hu-
man face space and therefore, in appropriate circumstances, an acceptable
tool for experimental manipulations. Chapter 5 subsequently addressed
an additional question relating to isotropy, namely systematic directional-
ity, and in particular whether it matters in terms of perceptual curvature.
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It was noted that previous work, and in particular a paper from Michael
Lewis’ lab [Ross et al., 2014], argued that directionality is of significance,
and in particular that perceptual curvature is greater in the tangential di-
rection than in the radial. Using a different experimental paradigm, and
the BFS versus the Stirling face database and Psychopmorph [B.Tiddeman
and Perrett, 2001], the same partial result was found here. Ross et al. com-
ment that particular ”participants were more sensitive to changes made to
a face in a direction oblique to the caricature [radial] vector” [Ross et al.,
2014]. Notwithstanding the parallels between the results of Ross et al.
and those presented here, the method deployed in chapter 5 offers addi-
tional insight, not evident from previous work. In particular, it utilised a
paraboloid fit to estimate the ”bowl”, so to speak, of perceptual change at
varying eccentricities, finding that not only was the tangential curvature
of perceptual change consistently greater than in the radial direction, but
that the ratio of these two curvatures became markedly greater with in-
creased eccentricity. This is demonstrated in figure 5.13 on page 182, and
was seen to be highly statistically significant. An important question is
what the most natural and plausible interpretation of this finding is. Here
again modelling would be of assistance in exploring the implications of
the various coding schemes that have been proposed, and were discussed
at some length in section 1.3.2 of chapter 1 (page 17). To summarise chap-
ter 5, it provides, first and foremost, a quantification of the accuracy of
BFS as a model of biological face space, using correlation coefficients as
the representative metric. The question of whether there are systematic
anisotropies is subsequently addressed, in particular between radial and
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tangential vectors. And it was finally demonstrated that not only is per-
ceptual change greater, per unit distance in BFS, in the tangential than the
radial directions, but that this difference becomes exaggerated with eccen-
tricity.
Overall, this thesis has examined two important aspects of perceptual
face space. Firstly, the temporal integration of information, and secondly
the utility of a computer-vision based model of face space as a model of
biological or perceptual face space. The implications of these findings sug-
gest some interesting avenues for future work, which have also been ex-
plored and potential improvements on the work already conducted have
been discussed.
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Acronyms
BFS Basel Face Space. 3, 18, 37, 152, 154, 163, 166, 168, 172, 173, 182, 183,
185, 191
CE Contrast Experiment. 6, 76, 78, 79, 82, 86, 88, 105, 106, 109, 110, 112,
113, 114, 128, 136, 150, 188, 190, 191
DBS Deep Brain Stimulation. 10
DE Dynamic Experiment. 6, 76, 78, 79, 82, 86, 88, 94, 95, 101, 103, 105, 106,
108, 112, 113, 114, 116, 118, 128, 136, 144, 147, 150, 188, 190, 191
FFDE Flashed Faces Distortion Effect. 75
FRU Face Recognition Unit. 144
GCM Generalised Context Model. 23
IAC Interactive Activation and Competition. 144, 145
MCMC Markov Chain Monte Carlo. 116, 129, 131, 132, 133, 190
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MSE Mean Squared Error. 165, 166, 168, 182
PCA Principal Component Analysis. 17, 23
PIU Person Identity Unit. 144
PRU Person Recognition Unit. 144
PSSH Physical Symbol System Hypothesis. 11
SED Situated Embodied Dynamic. 13
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